SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


SUBCONSCIOUS 
PHENOMENA 

BY 

HUGO    MUNSTERBERG 
THEODORE  RIBOT 

PIERRE  JANET 

JOSEPH  JASTROW 

BERNARD  HART 

AND 

MORTON  PRINCE 


BOSTON 

RICHARD  G.  BADGER 

THE  GORHAM  PRESS 
I9IO 


Copyright,  1910,  by  Richard  G.  Badger 


All  Rights   heserved 


The  Gorham  Press,  Boston,  U.  S.  A, 


f'V  ,   ,  UNIVERSITY   OF  CAJ.IFOKXVI^ 

/^  ;  /  a^NTA  BARBARA  COLLEGE  LlBRARl 

5? 

CONTENTS 

Chapter  One 
The  Subconscious — Part  i i6 

Chapter  Two 
The  Subconscious — Part  2 33 

Chapter   Three 
The  Subconscious — Part  3 40 

Chapter  Four 
The  Subconscious — Part  4 53 

Chapter  Five 
The  Subconscious — Part  5 71 

Chapter  Six 
The  Conception  of  the  Subconscious.  .  .    102 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


Subconscious  Phenomena 


INTRODUCTION 

THERE  is  at  present  no  consensus 
of  opinion,  either  among  psy- 
chologists who  deal  with  the 
normal,  or  among  the  medical 
psychologists  who  deal  with  the 
abnormal,  as  to  the  class  of  phenomena  to 
which  the  term  "subconscious"  shall  be  ap- 
plied, or,  as  to  the  interpretation  of  these 
phenomena.  Thus,  few  writers  mean  the 
same  thing  by  "subconscious,"  and  even  when 
two  writers  agree  upon  the  same  psychologi- 
cal interpretation  of  given  phenomena  each 
is  likely  to  describe  different  sets  of  phe- 
nomena under  the  term.  It  has  seemed  ac- 
cordingly to  the  Editor  that  a  symposium  in 
which  those  who  deal  with  the  normal  and 
abnormal  might  thresh  out  the  difference  of 
views  would  be  timely  and  might  help  to  an 
agreement  in  terminology  at  least  and  possi- 
bly in  interpretation. 

The   following  general  statement  of  the 

9 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

present  terminology  and  meaning  of  the  sub- 
conscious will  be  of  assistance  to  the  general 
reader  in  following  the  discussion  in  this  and 
the  next  number.  Professor  Miinsterberg 
has  very  clearly  stated  the  three  dominant 
theories  of  the  subconscious  backed  respec- 
tively by  laymen,  physicians  and  psycholo- 
gists, and  it  is  well  that  these  three  be  kept 
well  in  the  foreground  of  the  discussion.  Per- 
haps these  three  types  are  sufficient  for  a 
discussion  in  a  symposium,  and  yet,  there  are 
three  other  meanings  of  the  subconscious, 
one  or  other  of  which  is  held  by  individual 
writers  and  of  which  the  reader  should  be 
reminded  at  least.  These  six  may  be  sum- 
marized thus :  First,  it  is  used  to  describejthaT 
portion  of  our  field  of  consciousness  which, 
at  any  given  moment,  is  outside  the  focus  of 
our  attention;  a  region  therefore,  as  it  is 
conceived,  of  diminished  attention.  Subcon- 
sciousness here,  therefore,  means  the  margi- 
nal states  or  fringe  of  consciousness  of  any 
given  moment,  and  the  prefix  sub  designates 
the  diminished  or  partial  awareness  that  we 
have  for  these  states  out  in  the  corner  of  our 
mind's  eye. 

The  second  meaning  (Professor  Miinster- 

lO 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

berg's  second  type)  involves  a  theory  which 
is  an  interpretation  of  the  facts.  It  is  with 
this  meaning  particularly  that  the  term  is 
used  in  abnormal  psychology.  Subconscious  \ 
ideas  are  dissociated  or  split-off  ideas;  split 
off  from  the  main  personal  consciousness, 
from  the  focus  of  attention — if  that  term  be 
preferred — in  such  fashion  that  the  subject 
is  entirely  unaware  of  them,  though  they  are 
not  inert  but  active.  These  split-off  ideas 
may  be  limited  to  isolated  sensations,  like 
the  lost  tactile  sensations  of  anesthesia;  or 
may  be  aggregated  into  groups  or  systems. 
In  other  words,  they  form  a  consciousness 
coexisting  with  the  primary  consciousness, 
and  thereby  a  doubling  of  consciousness  re- 
sults. The  split-off  consciousness  may  dis- 
play extraordinary  activity.  The  primary 
personal  consciousness  as  a  general  rule  is 
of  course  the  main  and  larger  consciousness; 
but  under  exceptional  conditions,  as  in  some 
types  of  automatic  writing,  the  personal  con- 
sciousness may  be  reduced  to  rudimentary 
proportions,  while  the  secondary  conscious- 
ness may  rob  the  former  of  the  greater  part 
of  its  faculties  and  become  the  dominant  con- 
sciousness. 

n 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

The  third  meaning  (Professor  Miinster- 
berg's  first  type)  is  an  elaboration  and  ex- 
tension of  the  second,  and  thus  becomes  a 
theory  which  not  only  gives  an  elaborate  in- 
terpretation of  the  facts  of  observation,  but 
becomes  a  broad  generalization  in  that  it 
propounds  a  principle  of  both  normal  and 
abnormal  life.  Under  it  the  dissociated  states 
become  synthesized  among  themselves  into  a 
large  self-conscious  personality,  to  which  the 
term  "self"  is  given.  \  Subconscious  states 
thus  become  personified  "arid  are  spoken  of 
as  the  "subconscious  self,"  "subliminal  self," 
"hidden  self,"  "secondary  self,"  etc.;  and 
this  subconscious  self  is  conceived  of  as  mak- 
ing up  a  part  of  every  human  mind, 
whether  normal  or  abnormal,  and  is  sup- 
posed to  play  a  very  large  part  in  our  mental 
life.  Thus  every  mind  is  double;  not  in  the 
moderate  sense  of  two  trains  of  thought  go- 
ing on  at  the  same  time,  or  being  engaged 
with  two  distinct  and  separate  series  of  ac- 
tions at  the  same  time;  or  even  in  the  sense 
of  there  being  certain  limited  discreet  per- 
ceptions of  which  the  personal  consciousness 
is  not  aware;  but  in  the  sense  of  having  two 
selves  which  are  often  given  special  domains 

12 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

of  their  own  and  spoken  of  as  upper  and 
lower;  the  waking  and  submerged  selves,  etc. 
This  theory,  therefore,  not  only  extends  the 
principle  of  dissociated  ideas  into  normal  life 
and  makes  these  constant  elements  of  the  hu- 
man mind,  but  enlarges  the  subconscious  syn- 
thesis into  something  that  is  self-conscious 
and  which  can  speak  of  itself  as  an  "I." 

The  fourth  meaning  of  subconscious  is  that 
which  by  definition  would  have  it  include; 
first,  the  dissociated  ideas  embraced  under 
the  second  definition  above  stated;  and  sec- 
cond,  all  those  past  conscious  experiences 
which  are  either  forgotten  and  can  not  be 
recalled,  or  which  may  be  recalled  as  mem- 
ories, but  for  the  moment  are  out  of  mind 
because  in  the  march  of  events  our  thoughts 
have  passed  on  and  we  are  thinking  about 
something  else.  All  these  potential  mem- 
ories are  placed  in  the  subconscious  which 
plainly  is  thus  made  to  define  two  classes  of 
facts;  namely,  dissociated  states  which  are 
active,  and  those  which  are  inactive,  i.  e., 
forgotten,  or  out  of  mind  (Sidis'  definition). 

The  fifth  use  of  the  term  (Myers'  doc- 
trine) is  an  expansion  of  the  third  meaning 
and  involves  a  metaphysical  doctrine  which 

13 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

transcends  all  facts  which  one  can  possibly 
observe  in  others  or  introspect  in  himself.  It 
is  more  specifically  described  as  the  "sublimi- 
nal," which  is  used  as  a  synonym  for  subcon- 
scious. The  subconscious  ideas,  instead  of 
being  mental  states  dissociated  from  the 
main  personality,  now  become  the  main  res- 
ervoir of  consciousness  and  the  personal  con- 
sciousness becomes  a  subordinate  stream 
flowing  out  of  this  great  storage  basis  of 
"subliminal"  ideas  as  they  are  called.  We 
have  within  us  a  great  tank  of  consciousness 
but  we  are  conscious  of  only  a  small  portion 
of  its  contents.  In  other  words,  of  the  sum 
total  of  conscious  states  within  us  only  a 
small  portion  forms  the  personal  conscious- 
ness. The  personal  self  becomes  even  an  in- 
ferior consciousness  emerging  out  of  a  su- 
perior subliminal  consciousness  sometimes 
conceived  as  part  of  a  transcendental  world, 
and  this  subliminal  consciousness  is  made  the 
source  of  flights  of  genius  on  the  one  hand, 
while  it  controls  the  physical  processes  of  the 
body  on  the  other. 

The  sixth  meaning  (Professor  Miinster- 
berg's  third  type)  of  the  term  is  an  interpre- 
tation on  pure  physiological  principles  of  the 

14 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

phenomena  customarily  attributed  to  the  ac- 
tivity of  dissociated  ideas.  Some  psycholo- 
gists believe  that  phenomena  like  automatic 
writing  and  speech,  the  so-called  subconscious 
solution  of  arithmetical  problems,  hysterical 
outbursts,  etc.,  can  be  best  explained  as  pure 
neural  processes  unaccompanied  by  any  men- 
tation whatsoever.  These  phenomena  be- 
come therefore  pure  physiological  organic 
processes  of  the  body.  The  term  subcon- 
scious thus  becomes  equivalent  to  the  old 
theory  of  Carpenter's  "unconscious  cerebra- 
tion. 


15 


CHAPTER  ONE 

BY  HUGO  MUNSTERBERG 

Professor  of  Psychology,  Harvard 

THE  few  pages  which  a  symposium 
allows  do  not  give  opportunity 
to  sift  the  material  which  has 
led  to  the  doctrine  of  the  sub- 
liminal consciousness.  My  prac- 
tical studies  in  hypnotism,  hysteria,  automat- 
ic writing  and  similar  abnormalities  suggest 
to  me  decided  hesitation  in  accepting  the 
whole  of  the  usual  evidence  without  cross-ex- 
amination. And  yet,  to  find  a  common  basis 
for  a  theoretical  inquiry,  it  certainly  seems 
wiser  not  to  quarrel  about  the  experiences  but 
rather  to  accept  the  facts  as  the  most  san- 
guine observer  might  present  them. 

Yet,  even  if  we  welcome  the  observed  facts 
in  their  widest  limits,  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  subconscious  itself  is  never  among 
them.  The  facts  which  we  find  must  be  eith- 
er conscious  psychical  facts  from  which  we 
draw  inferences  as  to  subconscious  psychical 

i6 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

states,  or  physical  expressions  which  cannot 
be  explained  by  conscious  ideas,  emotions, 
volitions,  and  which  thus  demand  not-con- 
scious factors  for  their  explanation.  The 
conscious  experience  of  crystal-vision  or  of 
remembering  the  tactual  experiences  of  an 
anaesthetic  hand  or  the  sudden  solution  of  a 
problem  which  had  slipped  from  conscious- 
ness, or,  if  you  will,  every  act  of  genius  may 
point  to  such  hypothetical  subconscious  pro- 
cesses, but  certainly  the  conscious  seeing  and 
remembering  and  solving  is  given,  while  the 
subconscious  is  constructed  for  purposes  of 
explanation.  In  the  same  way  the  physical 
processes  of  automatic  writing  or  of  hysteric 
action  are  observable;  the  subconscious  agen- 
cies are  super-added  elaborations. 

To  acknowledge  that  the  subconscious  is 
found  only  through  constructions  in  the  ser- 
vice of  explanation  does  not  detract  from  its 
scientific  reality;  the  fluid  core  of  the  earth  is 
of  the  same  logical  type.  But  such  aclcnowl- 
edgment  does  imply  that  the  only  correct 
question  is  this :  which  of  the  many  construc- 
tions of  the  not-conscious  causes  is  most  use- 
ful for  the  explanation  of  the  observed  facts? 
It  is  evident,  however,  that  the  preference 

17 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

for  one  construction  or  another  may  and 
must  be  influenced  by  various  sidefactors. 
When,  for  instance,  the  physician  approaches 
those  facts,  his  interest  tends  naturally  to 
their  practical  treatment.  He  thus  shapes 
his  constructions  in  a  way  which  brings  the 
differences  from  normal  mental  life  to  the 
clearest  relief  and  which  offers  a  simple 
working  description,  definite  enough  to  de- 
termine beforehand  the  events  to  be  expected 
in  the  behavior  of  the  patient.  When  on  the 
other  hand  the  layman  comes  to  the  same 
facts,  he  is  struck  by  their  surprising  character 
and  this  wonder  awakes  the  feeling  of  the 
general  mysteriousness  of  the  world;  he  thus 
tends  to  prefer  a  construction  which  explains 
the  observed  facts  in  a  way  that  leads  at  the 
same  time  to  the  satisfaction  of  higher  de- 
sires, perhaps  even  of  religious  emotions. 
When,  finally,  the  theoretical  psychologist 
approaches  the  same  facts,  he  has  in  mind  no 
therapeutical  treatment  or  emotional  de- 
mand, and  yet  he  too  looks  out  far  beyond 
the  curious  facts  themselves;  his  interest  is 
turned  toward  the  remainder  of  mental  life, 
and  he  thus  prefers  explanations  which  bring 
the  abnormal  facts  in  closest  relation  to  the 

i8 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

normal  processes  and  cover  both  by  the  same 
formulae. 

We  therefore  find  three  types  of  theories, 
the  first  backed  mostly  by  laymen,  the  sec- 
ond by  physicians,  the  third  by  psychologists. 
Yet  the  lines  are  not  to  be  drawn  sharply. 
That  first  group  says:  the  subconsciousness  is 
the  psychical  system  of  a  full  real  personality 
below  the  conscious  person;  that  subconscious 
self  remembers,  thinks,  feels,  wills  on  its  own 
accord,  influences  our  conscious  life,  helps  it 
out,  shines  through  it  and  causes  the  abnor- 
mal facts.  The  popular  mind  clings  to  such 
a  convenient  method  of  explanation  the  more 
closely  as  it  is  on  this  basis  easy  to  bring  the 
subconscious  selves  into  telepathic  connection 
or  to  link  them  with  mystical  agencies.  The 
second  group  says :  the  subconscious  is  psy- 
chical but  not  a  system,  it  is  made  up  of  ideas, 
but  they  do  not  at  first  form  a  personality;  it 
is  dissociated  split  off  mental  material  which 
only  in  a  secondary  way  may  flow  together 
into  a  new  detached  self.  The  subconscious 
is  then  not  at  all  a  regular  psychical  founda- 
tion but  something  either  pathological  or  at 
least  artificial.  The  third  group,  finally, 
says:  the  subconscious  that  underlies  the  ab- 

19 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

normal  facts  is  the  same  that  underlies  the 
ordinary  processes  of  memory,  attention, 
etc. :  it  is  not  psychical  at  all  but  a  physiologi- 
cal brain  process. 

The  emotional  demands  of  the  mystic,  the 
practical  demands  of  the  physician,  and  the 
theoretical  demands  of  the  psychologist  are 
well  fulfilled  by  these  three  types  of  theories, 
and  to  a  certain  extent  they  can  be  helpful 
side  by  side;  the  purpose  which  we  have  be- 
fore us  determines  each  time  which  of  the 
three  modes  of  construction  is  most  useful 
for  our  special  end.  At  least  the  second 
theory  finds  points  of  contact  with  each  of 
the  others.  With  the  first  it  shares  the  belief 
that  the  subconscious  is  psychical,  while  the 
p^  one  conceives  it  as  systematized,  the  other  as 
dissociated.  With  the  third  it  shares  the  con- 
viction that  there  is  no  independent  self  be- 
low the  consciousness,  while  the  one  calls  the 
underlying  processes  psychical,  the  other  phy- 
siological. This  latter  difference  does  not  de- 
ter the  friends  of  the  second  theory  from  ad- 
mitting also  a  physiological  basis  for  the 
subconscious  ideas,  nor  the  adherents  of  the 
third  theory  from  using  psychological  terms 
like  idea,  emotion,  volition,  for  the  short  de- 

20 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

scription  of  those  complex  physiological 
events  as  if  they  were  accompanied  by  psychi- 
cal phenomena.  Yet,  the  difference  of  prin- 
ciple remains,  and  if  I  have  to  choose,  I  feel 
inclined  to  take  the  place  with  the  psychol- 
ogists in  the  third  group;  the  subconscious  is 
not  psychical  at  all.  J 

I  point  here  only  to  the  most  general  rea- 
sons which  determine  my  decision.  The  ex- 
planations which  every  theory  of  the  sub- 
conscious offers  are  twofold.  There  is  firstly 
a  reservoir  which  keeps  the  subconscious 
ideas,  and  secondly  a  mental  workshop  which 
manufactures  the  products  of  thought  as  far 
as  they  are  not  elaborated  consciously.  The 
reservoir,  full  of  dissociated  ideas,  has  to 
explain  the  occurrence  of  strange  conscious 
ideas  and  of  otherwise  surprising  behavior. 
The  workshop  has  to  explain  the  conscious 
results  of  the  evidently  synthetic  labor  which 
goes  on  independently  of  our  conscious  con- 
trol. What  is  that  reservoir?  Of  course,  if 
we  call  it  a  reservoir  of  ideas  we  have  yielded 
the  whole  point;  ideas  are  of  mental  stuff. 
Students  of  abnormal  psychology  here  in- 
dulge in  the  same  type  of  circular  conclusion 
which  is  frequent  with  animal  psychologists. 

21 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

The  latter  reason  that  animals  of  a  certain 
development  must  have  consciousness  be- 
cause they  have  memory.  Memory  is  of 
course  a  psychological  expression,  and  the 
question  is  just  whether  the  behavior  of  those 
animals  has  to  be  explained  psychologically 
by  memory  or  physiologically  by  an  after- 
effect of  earlier  stimulations.  The  decision 
whether  the  onemode  of  explanation  or  other 
is  to  be  applied  cannot  itself  be  deduced  from 
the  observed  facts,  but  must  precede  the  study 
of  the  facts ;  with  other  words :  the  question 
whether  animals  have  consciousness  or  not 
cannot  be  answered  by  observation  but  be- 
longs to  epistemological  arguments.  In  the 
same  way  here;  no  fact  of  abnormal  experi- 
ence can  by  itself  prove  that  a  psychological 
and  not  a  physiological  explanation  is 
needed;  it  is  a  philosophical  problem  which 
must  be  settled  by  principle  before  the  ex- 
planation of  the  special  facts  begins. 

To  make  the  explanation  dependent  on  the 
special  abnormal  facts  is  the  more  unjustified 
as  the  situation  is  in  no  way  different  from 
that  of  ordinary  memory.  If  I  reproduce 
by  association  a  name  or  a  landscape  seen  ten 
years  ago  I  can  postulate  too  that  all  this  was 

22 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

lying  in  me  as  a  subconscious  idea  or  at  least 
as  a  mental  disposition  and  that  it  could  not 
be  reproduced  if  something  on  the  psychical 
side  were  not  lasting  through  those  ten  years 
outside  of  my  consciousness.  But  those  who 
insist  that  the  memory  idea  presupposes  a 
lasting  mental  disposition  and  cannot  be  ex- 
plained by  physiological  after-effect,  only  for- 
get that  the  same  logic  would  demand  a  spec- 
ial mental  disposition  also  for  each  new  per- 
ception. The  whole  "mystery"  of  an  idea 
entering  into  consciousness  presents  itself 
perfectly  every  time  when  we  use  our  eyes  or 
ears,  and  it  is  astonishing  how  easily  psychol- 
ogists overlook  the  parallelism  of  the  prob- 
lems in  regular  perception,  in  ordinary  mem- 
ory and  in  the  abnormal  awakening  of  disso- 
ciated ideas.  To  say  that  the  perceptive  idea 
too  finds  a  special  psychical  disposition  would 
be  absurd,  as  we  should  then  need  such  sub- 
conscious mental  agency  for  every  possible 
impression,  and  if  every  possible  impression 
is  equally  prepared  in  the  subconscious  the 
appearance  of  no  one  would  really  find  Its 
explanation  as  every  other  would  have  the 
same  chance.  In  the  case  of  the  perception 
we  are  thus  obliged  to  rest  in  the  explanation 

23 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

of  a  psychical  idea  by  a  physical  brain  pro- 
cess only.  But  if  the  fresh  idea  is  dependent 
only  on  the  fresh  excitement  in  the  brain, 
there  is  not  the  slightest  additional  difficulty 
in  interpreting  by  the  same  principle  the  re- 
current idea  of  memory  by  the  recurrent 
brain  process  without  any  reference  to  a  last- 
ing psychical  trace.  And  if  the  normal  mem- 
ory can  work  without  subconscious  mental 
help,  there  is  no  reason  suddenly  to  presup- 
pose it  for  the  abnormal  awaking  of  appar- 
ently unaccountable  ideas  as  in  crystal  vision 
and  a  hundred  similar  phenomena.  The  illu- 
sions of  the  ordinary  memory  easily  lead 
over  from  the  normal  reproduction  to  the 
pathological.  Brain  processes  without  sub- 
conscious psychical  forerunners  furnish  all 
that  we  need  in  the  abnormal  cases  for  the 
same  kind  of  understanding  which  science 
has  for  seeing  and  hearing. 

But  if  we  have  no  reservoir  with  stored-up 
subconscious  ideas,  we  cannot  have  a  work- 
shop either  to  prepare  therein  subconsciously 
combinations  of  subliminal  material.  It  is 
again  the  physiological  action  which  is  entire- 
ly sufficient  to  explain  just  as  much  as  the 
mental  mechanism  could  explain.     Of  course 

24 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

popular  science  turns  naturally  to  psychical 
conceptions  first,  because  those  hidden  pro- 
cesses which  we  must  presuppose  to  explain 
the  conscious  results  are  thoroughly  pur- 
posive and  selective.  But  have  we  really  a 
right  to  insist  that  purpose  and  selection  re- 
fer necessarily  to  psychical  factors  and  are 
incomparable  with  physiological  processes? 
On  the  contrary,  whenever  purpose  means  as 
it  does  mean  in  this  case  a  certain  adaptation 
to  the  ends  of  the  individual  we  must  ac- 
knowledge that  every  organism  shows  such 
purposiveness.  When  the  body  digests  a  meal 
a  hundred  thousand  cells  are  performing  the 
most  complex  acts  for  the  purposes  of  the 
organism,  and  they  select  the  right  chemical 
processes  more  safely  than  any  chemist 
would  be  able  to  do:  yet  nobody  presupposes 
that  there  is  a  mental  interplay  in  the  intes- 
tines. In  the  same  way  all  the  other  tissues 
are  performing  adjusted  acts  by  physiologi- 
cal causes :  have  we  any  reason  to  expect  less 
from  the  tissues  of  the  central  nervous  sys- 
tem? Why  cannot  they  too  produce  physio- 
logical processes  that  lead  to  well-adjusted 
results  and  that  means  to  apparently  pur- 
posive sensorial  excitements  and  motor  im- 

25 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

pulses.  But  we  must  go  much  further  still. 
Not  only  that  the  physiological  cerebration 
is  well  able  to  produce  the  "intellectual"  re- 
sult, but  the  physiological  side  alone  is  fit  for 
it,  the  psychological  is  utterly  unfit.  To  the 
popular  mind  that  statement  seems  of  course 
absurd,  and  indeed  it  needs  some  philosophi- 
cal insight  into  the  logic  of  sciences  to  appre- 
ciate the  situation.  To  bring  it  to  short  for- 
mulation, of  course  without  full  argument, 
we  might  characterize  it  as  follows.  Our  in- 
ner life  is  a  system  of  attitudes,  of  purposes, 
of  will.  But  it  is  not  for  psychology  to  deal 
with  the  inner  life  in  its  immediate  teleologi- 
cal  reality.  This  real  life  and  its  real  inner 
connectedness  demand  for  their  understand- 
ing our  interpretation  and  appreciation  it  is 
furnished  for  instance  by  the  student  of  his- 
tory or  of  philosophy.  Psychology,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  a  science  which  aims  at  descrip- 
tion and  explanation  of  inner  life,  a  logical 
attitude  which  is  artificial.  Psychology  con- 
siders the  inner  experience  , therefore,  for  its 
special  purpose  as  a  series  of  describable 
phenomena;  it  transforms  the  felt  realities  of 
will  into  perceivable  objects,  into  contents  of 
consciousness.    Through  this  transformation 

26 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

the  real  purposiveness,  yes,  the  whole  inner 
connection  of  the  will  acts  is  eliminated;  the 
psychological  phenomena  as  such  have  no  in- 
tentions and  no  significance  any  more  but  are 
merely  bits  of  lifeless  mental  material,  com- 
plexes of  unphysical  objects  made  up  of  ele- 
ments which  we  call  sensations.  And  this 
material  which,  through  the  objectification, 
has  lost  all  its  inner  teleological  ties,  has  not 
even  the  chance  to  enter  into  any  direct  cau- 
sal connections.  The  physical  phenomena 
can  and  must  be  conceived  as  causally  con- 
nected, the  psychical  not.  There  cannot  be 
causality  where  the  objects  do  not  last  but 
are  destroyed  in  the  very  act  of  their  appear- 
ance; just  this  is  characteristic  of  all  psycho- 
logical contents.  The  world  is  physical,  in  so 
far  as  we  conceive  it  as  identical  with  itself 
in  ever  new  experiences,  and  to  elaborate  this 
self-identity  of  the  material  universe  is  the 
meaning  of  the  causal  treatment.  The  ob- 
ject is  psychical  just  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  iden- 
tical in  new  experiences,  but  is  created  anew 
in  every  act.  Therefore  there  is  no  direct 
causal  connection  of  the  psychologized  in- 
ner life;  therefore  there  is  only  an  indirect 
causal  explanation  of   psychical    phenomena 

27 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

possible  in  so  far  as  they  can  be  conceived  as 
accompaniments  of  physiological  processes. 
In  short,  even  the  full  conscious  mental  facts 
do  not  really  hang  together  when  viewed 
from  a  psychological  point  of  view  and  are 
thus  unfit  to  explain  any  results  through  their 
causal  interplay;  they  are  epiphenomena,  and 
the  causal  working  of  the  objectified  con- 
scious facts  goes  on  in  the  physiological  sub- 
stratum. How  misleading,  therefore,  to  in- 
vent and  to  construct  subconscious  psychical 
phenomena  for  the  express  purpose  of  pro- 
ducing causal  results  instead  of  leaving  that 
to  the  safe  action  of  the  cerebrum.  The  only 
motive  for  doing  it  is  the  popular  confusion, 
— certainly  not  unfrequent  even  among  psy- 
chologists,— which  does  not  discriminate  be- 
tween the  psychological  material  as  part  of 
the  world  of  phenomena  and  the  teleological 
significance  of  our  inner  life  in  the  world  of 
meaning.  The  will  as  purpose  binds  by  its 
meaning  the  facts  of  immediate  life  together 
and  enters  as  such  into  ethics  or  law  or  his- 
tory, but  the  will  as  psychological  content  of 
consciousness  does  not  bind  anything  and 
does  not  point  to  anything  beyond  itself;  it  is 
simply  a  passing  phenomenon.    And  yet  only 

28 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

in  this  unreal  form,  constructed  by  abstrac- 
tions and  conceptions,  the  will  can  enter  into 
the  system  of  descriptive  and  explanatory 
science.  In  the  explanatory  system  of  psy- 
chology the  purpose  as  such  does  thus  not 
explain  anything,  just  as  astronomy  has 
learned  that  the  sixteenth  century  mixed  the 
categories  when  the  beauty  of  certain  astron- 
omical curves  was  taken  as  the  actual  cause 
for  certain  astronomical  movements. 

There  is  thus  no  reason  to  conceive  a  psy- 
chical fact  existing  outside  of  consciousness, 
— and  that  corresponds  to  the  only  significant 
meaning  of  consciousness.  Consciousness  is 
nothing  which  can  be  added  to  the  existing 
mental  facts,  but  it  indicates  just  the  existence 
of  the  psychical  phenomena.  Consciousness 
cannot  do  anything,  cannot  look  here  and 
there  and  shine  on  some  ideas  and  leave  oth- 
ers without  illumination.  No,  consciousness 
means  merely  the  logical  relation  point  of  its 
contents;  the  psychical  phenomena  are  in 
consciousness  as  the  physical  phenomena  are 
in  nature;  there  cannot  be  physical  phenom- 
ena outside  of  nature.  Seen  in  this  way  the 
psychologist  must  sharply  separate  those 
pathological  cases  which    really   show    posi- 

29 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

tive  abnormal  phenomena  in  the  conscious 
facts  themselves  and  those  which  from  the 
standpoint  of  consciousness  present  negative 
occurrences  only, — blanks  where  ideas  are 
expected.  To  the  first  class  belongs,  for  in- 
stance, the  alternating  personality;  that  is  an 
abnormal  grouping  of  psychical  experiences. 
To  the  second  class  belong  all  those  various 
phenomena  which  give  rise  to  the  theory  of 
dissociated  or  automatic  subconscious  psychi- 
cal processes.  The  dissociated  idea  is  psy- 
chologically not  existent  just  as  the  ticking  of 
the  clock  in  my  room  does  not  exist  for  me 
when  my  attention  is  turned  to  my  reading; 
the  ticking  reaches  my  brain  and  may  there 
have  after-effects,  but  the  sound-sensation  is 
inhibited.  In  this  way  all  that  which  sug- 
gested the  theory  of  the  mental  subconscious 
becomes  simply  increased  or  decreased  inhibi- 
tion. Why  the  mental  accompaniments  of 
certain  physiological  processes  are  some- 
times inhibited  must  of  course  itself  be  ex- 
plained physiologically;  everything  seems  to 
point  to  the  relation  between  sensory  excite- 
ment and  the  openness  or  closedness  of  the 
motor  channels  of  discharge. 

It  Is  true  that  such  physiological  explana- 

30 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

tion  gives  small  foothold  for  that  mystical 
expansion  of  the  theory  which  seemed  so  eas 
ily  reached  from  the  subconscious  mental 
life.  But  it  is  not  the  least  merit  of  the 
scientific  physiological  explanation  that  it  ob- 
structs the  path  of  such  pseudophilosophy. 
Psychology  even  if  it  takes  in  psychological 
phenomena  which  he  under  the  cover  of  the  \ 
subconscious,  can  never  be  the  starting  point 
for  a  metaphysical  view  of  reality  because, 
as  we  pointed  out,  the  psychological  material 
has  been  reached  by  an  artificial  transforma- 
tion of  the  real  life  experience.  The  psycho- 
logical phenomena  are  as  unreal  as  the  atoms 
which  mathematical  physics  constructs  for  its 
logical  purposes.  If  we  seek  real  philosophy 
we  must  go  back  to  the  true  immediate  will 
experience  out  of  which  the  psychological 
constructions  are  shaped  but  which  is  as  such 
not  possible  object  of  description.  An  inter- 
pretation and  appreciative  understanding  of 
this  real  life,  even  in  the  most  idealistic  phil- 
osophy, can  then  never  conflict  even  with  the 
most  radical  physiological  explanation  of  ab- 
normal psychology.  The  physiological  psy- 
chologist thus  ought  carefully  to  avoid  the 
language  of  the  subliminal  self  theory  as  it 

31 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

flows  over  too  easily  into  antiphilosophy. 
But  he  has  no  reason  to  avoid  the  language 
of  the  dissociated-idea,  theory — provided 
that  the  psychological  word  is  taken  as  a 
short  label  for  the  very  complex  neural  phy- 
siological process.  If  I  had  to  write  the  his- 
tory of  Miss  Beauchamp  I  should  conceive 
all  subconscious  processes  in  physiological 
conceptions,  but  I  should  describe  them,  for 
clearness  and  convenience  sake,  as  the  mas- 
ter of  our  symposium  has  so  masterly  done, 
in  the  terms  of  psychological  language. 


32 


CHAPTER  TWO 

BY  THEODORE  RIBOT 
Professor  of  Psychology,  College  de  France 

THE  question  of  the  subconscious  is 
so  broad,  so  complex  and  so  ob- 
scure that  I  shall  be  content  if, 
in  the  brief  remarks  which  fol- 
low, I  succeed  in  throwing  even 
a  little  light  upon  it. 

In  this  question  we  must  distinguish  two 
sides:  the  positive,  composed  of  facts;  and 
the  hypothetical  made  up  of  theories. 

With  regard  to  the  facts,  I  find  it  advan- 
tageous to  establish  two  categories: 

First:  The  static  subconscious,  comprising 
habits,  memory  and,  in  general,  all  organized 
knowledge.  It  is  a  state  of  conservatism,  of 
repose  (albeit  relative),  since  representa- 
tions undergo  incessant  corrosions  and  meta- 
morphoses within  themselves. 

Second:  The  dynamic  subconscious  which 
is  a  latent  state  of  activity,  of  incubation  and 
elaboration.    Authors  who  have  treated  this 

33 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

subject,  have  furnished  examples  of  it  in  pro- 
fusion. From  this  source  comes  inventive 
work,  inspiration  in  all  sorts  of  discoveries, 
improvisation  and  even — tc  a  feebler  degree 
and  in  a  more  modest  form — sudden  repar- 
tee and  bons  mots;  in  short  everything  which 
sparkles  forth  from  us  spontaneously. 

Naturally,  discussion  and  conjecture  have 
focussed  by  preference  upon  the  subconscious 
processes  we  call  "dynamic,"  since  these  are 
the  most  varied  and  the  most  fertile  in  re- 
sults. 

On  the  nature  of  this  subconscious  activity, 
however,  one  finds  only  discord  and  obscur- 
ity. "Doubtless,  one  may  maintain  that,  in 
the  case  of  the  inventor,  everything  goes  on 
in  the  subconscious  as  it  does  ordinarily  in 
consciousness  itself,  barring  a  message  which 
does  not  reach  the  e^o;  that  the  work  which 
one  may  follow  in  consciousness,  with  its  ad- 
vances and  its  retrocessions,  is  identical  with 
what  goes  on  without  our  knowledge.  Such 
an  hypothesis  is  possible,  but  far  from 
proved. 

Again,  concerning  the  essential  nature  of 
subconscious  activity,  two  diametrically  op- 
posed theories  have  been  put  forward: 

34 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

The  first  (Myers,  Delboeuf  and  other 
more  recent  authors)  bears  the  stamp  of  a 
peculiar  biologic  mysticism.  According  to 
these  authors,  in  certain  men  subconscious 
activity  is  invested  with  almost  supernatural 
power,  not  only  of  a  trophic  and  physio- 
logic, but  also  of  a  psychologic  order,  and 
constitutes  in  the  individual  an  intermediate 
link  between  the  human  and  the  divine. 

The  second,  which  has  attained  its  most 
complete  expression  in  Boris  Sidis'  book  on 
suggestion,  draws  this  picture  of  our  subcon- 
scious, which  is  far  from  flattering:  it  (the 
subconscious)  is  stupid,  uncritical,  extremely 
credulous,  without  morality,  and  its  principal 
mental  mechanism  is  that  of  the  brute — asso- 
ciation by  contiguity. 

In  my  opinion  two  such  hypotheses  are  not 
at  bottom  irreconcilable,  since  the  above  ad- 
vantages and  defects  make  an  integral  part 
of  human  nature  taken  in  its  totality,  and 
since  they  are  unequally  distributed  among 
men.  A  much  more  important  question,  how- 
ever, is  that  of  the  ultimate  nature  of  sub- 
conscious activity.  Although  many  authors 
have  tried  to  evade  it  by  enveloping  it  in  ob- 
scurity and  doubt,  it  comes  back  to  this  inex- 

35 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

orable  dilemma, — psychologic  or  physiolog- 
ic? 

The  psychologic  solution  rests  upon  an 
equivocal  use  of  the  word  conscious.  The 
conscious  bears  an  unvarying  stamp :  it  is  an 
internal  event,  which  exists,  not  in  itself,  but 
for  me  and  in  so  far  as  it  is  recognized  by 
me.  Now,  this  solution  admits  that,  if  from 
the  clear  realm  of  consciousness  one  descends 
to  the  "marginal"  consciousness  and  finally 
continues  to  go  lower  and  lower  to  the  un- 
conscious, which  only  manifests  itself  by  mo- 
tor reactions,  the  primitive  state  thus  impov- 
erished continues  to  remain  to  the  end  identi- 
cal in  its  essence  with  the  conscious.  Under- 
lying the  psychologic  theory,  in  all  its  forms, 
there  is  the  tacit  hypothesis  that  the  conscious 
is  assimilable  to  a  quantity  which  may  de- 
crease indefinitely  without  ever  reaching 
zero.  It  is  a  postulate  which  nothing  justi- 
fies. The  experience  of  psychophysiclans 
with  regard  to  the  "threshold"  of  the  con- 
scious, without  settling  the  question,  would 
rather  justify  the  contrary  opinion:  the  per- 
ceptible minimum  appears  and  disappears 
brusquely.  This  fact  and  others  which 
might  easily  be  pointed  out  seem  to  me  un- 

36 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

favorable  to  the  hypothesis  of  the  increasing 
or  decreasing  continuity  of  the  conscious. 

The  physiologic  solution  is  simple  and 
comprises  few  variants.  It  maintains  that 
subconscious  activity  is  purely  cerebral;  the 
psychic  factor  which  ordinarily  accompanies 
the  work  of  the  nervous  centres  is  absent.  I 
incline  toward  this  hypothesis,  without  dis- 
regarding its  shortcomings  and  its  difficul- 
ties; but,  at  least,  it  seems  to  me  not  contra- 
dictory as  is  the  adverse  hypothesis.  It  has 
been  established  by  numerous  experiences 
(Fere,  Binet,  Mosso,  Janet,  Newbold,  etc.) 
that  unconscious  sensations  (not  apper- 
ceived)  act,  since  they  produce  the  same  re- 
action as  conscious  sensation,  and  Mosso  has 
been  able  to  maintain  "that  the  testimony  of 
consciousness  is  less  reliable  than  that  of  the 
sphygmograph,"  but  there  are  cases  more 
complex.  For  instance,  that  of  invention  is 
quite  different,  for  it  does  not  merely  sup- 
pose the  adaptation  to  an  end  which  the  phy- 
siologic factor  would  suffice  to  explain;  it  im- 
plies a  series  of  adaptations,  corrections,  and 
rational  operations  whose  nervous  action  of 
itself  furnishes  us  but  few  examples.  In 
spite  of  everything,  I  am  coming  more  and 

37 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

more  to  the  side  of  the  physiologic  hypothesis 
and  am  quite  in  accord  with  the  opinion  re- 
cently set  forth  in  America  by  Jastrow,  and 
more  clearly  by  A.  H.  Pierce  in  his  "Studies 
in  Philosophy  and  Psychology"  (1906),  in 
which  he  has  presented  in  favor  of  the  cere- 
bral interpretation  such  an  excellent  plea  that 
further  attempts  in  this  line  seem  to  me  use- 
less. 

There  still  remains  the  question  of  double 
personality,  or  to  be  more  exact,  of  multiple 
personality. 

At  the  present  time  the  majority  of  psy- 
chologists admit  that  the  ego,  the  person,  is  a 
synthetical  complex,  which  in  its  normal 
state,  is  made  up  of  relatively  stable  ele- 
ments, in  spite  of  incessant  variations.  In 
the  abnormal  cases,  when  a  new  personality 
arises,  one  can  scarcely  doubt  that  the  sub- 
conscious lends  its  aid  to  its  formation;  on 
the  one  hand,  in  its  static  form,  by  the  resur- 
rection of  habits  or  of  memories  which 
seemed  lost;  on  the  other  hand,  in  the  appari- 
tion of  intellectual  or  moral  dispositions — 
higher  or  lower,  good  or  evil, — which,  latent 
until  then,  characterize  the  new  ego. 

This  psychologic  problem  is  nevertheless 

38 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

quite  different  from  that  concerning  the  na- 
ture of  the  subconscious.  This  new  synthe- 
sis, of  which  the  subconscious  furnishes  only 
the  materials  (and  these  only  in  part),  de- 
pends upon  profound  causes,  probably  phy- 
siologic, having  their  roots  in  cenesthesia. 
Whatever  opinion  one  may  emit  upon  this 
last  cause,  it  is  a  distinct  study  which  begins 
here;  subconscious  processes  play  a  role 
which  is  secondary  and  subordinate  and  are, 
properly  speaking,  a  result,  an  effect. 


39 


CHAPTER  THREE 

BY  JOSEPH  JASTROW 

Professor  of  Psychology,  University  of  Wis- 
consin 

TO  one  who  has  devoted  a  volume* 
to  an  exposition  of  subconscious 
phenomena,  the  invitation  to 
contribute  to  a  symposium  is 
naturally  interpreted  as  a  re- 
quest for  a  statement  of  the  underlying  and 
supporting  conceptions  of  the  work  in  ques- 
tion. The  difficulty  in  meeting  this  request 
is  inherent  in  the  phenomena  themselves;  for 
it  is  the  nature  of  these  to  require  delicate 
shadings  and  gradings  and  all  the  complex 
blendings  of  a  difficult  chiaroscuro,  in  order 
to  shape  the  resulting  dehneation  into  a  sig- 
nificant picture.  Yet  when  addressed  to 
those  who  are  familiar  with  the  picture  and  / 
its  genre,  and  equally  with  the  elements  and  / 

*The  Subconscious.    Part  three  is  especially  germane 
to  the  considerations  here  presented. 

40 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

the  technique  of  the  composition,  a  sketch 
with  reenforced  contours  and  unconcern  for 
transitions  and  corrections  will  meet  with 
ready  interpretation. 

I  deem  it  a  fundamental  requisite  of  any 
adequate  conception  of  the  subconscious  that 
it  makes  vital  connection  with  the  ordinary 
range  of  normal  mental  procedure,  finding 
a  natural  place  in  an  evolutionary  interpreta- 
tion of  psychic  function,  and  interpretable 
likewise  in  (general)  terms  of  neural  dispo- 
sition. Such  conception  finds  an  equal  obliga- 
tion to  discover  and  decipher  within  the 
range  of  normal  fluctuations,  a  great  diversi- 
ty of  relations, — of  excess  and  abeyance,  of 
distortion,  temperamental  facilitation  and 
exaggeration  and  impediment, — that  suggest 
unmistakably  the  minor  abnormalities  of  sub- 
conscious function.  It  is  difficult  to  overem- 
phasize the  significance  of  this  intermediate 
realm.  There  are  to  be  sought  the  sources 
of  the  streams,  whose  waters  in  turbulent 
confusion  break  through  their  normally  con- 
fining channels  in  seeming  lusus  naturae. 
With  these  obligations  fairly  met,  the  con- 
ception may  confidently  yet  tactfully  enter  the 
perplexing  field  of  the  abnormal,  and  in  so 

41 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

doing  will  be  disposed  to  emphasize  once 
more  the  transitory,  superficial,  introspective- 
ly  controllable  procedures,  that  in  their  es- 
trangement maintain  some  correspondence, 
— fragmentary,  uncertain,  elusive,  or  even  in- 
coherent in  part  though  it  be — with  the  nor- 
mal home  relations.  Thus  rooted  firmly  in 
normal  procedure,  the  conception  may  under- 
take the  special  analysis  of  the  complexly  ab- 
normal. 

The  aspect  of  the  resulting  conception 
would  admittedly  be  seriously  altered  if  it 
should  prove  necessary  in  order  to  account 
for  the  abnormal  varieties  of  experience,  to 
assume  a  system  of  psychic  relations  in  en- 
largement or  correction  of  those  seemingly 
adequate  for  normal  psychology,  and  then 
in  turn  to  revise  the  current  psychological 
conception  by  a  restatement  in  the  light  of 
the  abnormal.  Those  who  feel  themselves 
forced  by  logical  considerations  or  impelled 
by  temperamental  or  philosophical  prefer- 
ence to  have  recourse  to  such  a  remodeling 
of  psychological  relations  have  for  the  most 
part — and  with  wide  diversity  among  them- 
selves— proposed  some  form  of  secondary 
consciousness,  coordinate  or  subordinate  al- 

42 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ter  ego,  subliminal  self.  Finding,  notably  in 
cases  of  disordered  personality,  a  system  of 
mental  possessions  and  facilities  seemingly 
out  of  relation  to  those  of  the  normal  self, 
they  have  concluded  that  there  must  regular- 
ly be  such  psychic  satellites  in  the  orbit,  the 
presence  whereof  is  not  created  but  only  re- 
vealed by  a  favoring  eccentricity.  They  point 
out  the  notable  range  of  experience,  difficult 
of  explanation,  which  the  supposition  of  such 
a  psychic  relation  might  illuminate;  and  ar- 
gue that  any  supposition  that  dispenses  with 
such  a  psychic  co-partner  must  in  turn  resort 
to  devious  assumptions  to  include  within  its 
explanatory  scope  the  aforesaid  divergent  ex- 
periences. 

For  the  tendency  of  this  "dualistic"  hypo- 
thesis to  make  alliance  with  extreme  and  gra- 
tuitous assumptions,  the  scientific  formula- 
tion thereof  need  not  be  held  accountable.^ 

'The  argument  from  alleged  supernormal  powers  in 
freedom  from  or  violation  of  accepted  physical  and 
mental  limitations,  the  psychologist  is  hardly  called 
upon  to  consider;  though  its  actual  prominence  in  the 
literature  will  excuse  the  comment  that  such  use  of 
the  hypothesis  but  imposes  an  additional  burden  to  be 
borne,  and  does  not  contribute  to  the  logical  force  of 
the  argument.      To  one  firmly  convinced  of  the  truth 

43 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

The  mass  impression  of  the  realm  as  of  the 
detailed  features,  the  entire  trend  of  psycho- 
logical investigation  and  of  so  much  of  in- 
sight as  illumines  psychic  procedure,  seems  to 
me  overwhelmingly  and  consistently  to  bear 
against  any  such  assumption,  even  when  most 
objectively  and  logically  shaped.  Here  the 
ways  divide.  While  investigation  and  ac- 
cumulation of  data  may  proceed  profitably 
without  raising  this  issue,  systematic  interpre- 
tation cannot  go  far  without  revealing  the 
formative  trend  of  the  underlying  conception. 
To  me  the  subconscious  is  psychologically  sig- 
nificant and  logically  defensible  only  under 
some  form  of  concept  that  clusters  about  the 
organic  unity  of  the  mind,  and  from  such  a 
base  surveys  in  orderly  sequence  of  relation, 
the  divergent  realm  of  minor  and  major  ab- 
normalities. 

The  explanation  of  subconscious  proce- 
dure under  this  unitary  conception  is  still  be- 
set with  hypothesis;  the  sketch  thereof  made 
by  any  one  artist  inevitably  reflects  a  favorite 
perspective,  an  allegiance  of  school  and  meth- 


of  the  "supernormal"  data,  the  entire  physical  and 
mental  world — quite  as  legitimately  as  the  subcon- 
scious— may  require  an  entire  reconstruction. 

44 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

od.  Fundamentally  the  range  of  subconsmous 
function  must  find  a  place  in  the  mental  sys- 
tem by  reason  of  fitness  or  use,  reenforced 
and  developed  by  evolutionary  influences,  ul- 
timately of  a  highly  intricate  nature.  The 
degree  as  well  as  the  manner  of  feeling- 
awareness-  that  attaches  to  functions  that 
may  qualify  for  a  place  in  the  psychic  system 
is  conditioned  by  the  value  of  such  an  accom- 
paniment or  privilege  in  the  functional  effi- 
ciency. Fundamentally  the  subconscious  status 
of  certain  functions  is  an  expression  of  the 
mode  of  their  representation  in  the  physio- 
logical and  psychological  economy.  It  is  a 
fact  that  influences  in  the  shape  of  all  sorts 
and  conditions  of  stimuli,  play  upon  the  neu- 
ro-psychic  equipment  and  modify  its  expres- 
sive behavior.  If  the  reactions  to  such  stim- 
uli demanded  an  equable  distribution  of  feel- 
ing-awareness throughout  their  range,  there 
would  be  no  provision  (or  a  very  different 
one)  for  subconscious  functioning.  The  dis- 
tribution of  awareness  as  attaching  to  higher 
and  lower,  reflex  and  simply  automatic  and 

^At  times  a  neutral  term  without  the  inevitable  im- 
plications of  "consciousness"  is  useful.  For  this  I 
suggest  feeling-awareness. 

45 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

automatically  familiarized  behavior,  sets 
forth  this  relation;  as,  again,  direct  experi- 
mentation by  an  "impressionistic"  response 
to  aspects  of  stimuli  equalized  beyond  explicit 
differentiation  or  recognition  corroborates 
the  result. 

The  analysis  of  subconscious  procedure  ac- 
quires additional  complexity  through  the  in- 
herent many-sidedness  of  acquisition  and  ex- 
pression. Through  the  facilitation  brought 
about  by  experience,  a  lesser  degree  of 
awareness,  a  suppressed  variety  of  its  pres- 
ence, accompanies — the  sensitiveness  to  and 
the  interpretation  of  outer  stimuli  as  well  as 
the  voluntary  aspect  of  the  response  (initia- 
tive). An  equally  important  determinant  is 
the  distribution  of  the  attentive  attitude,  in 
itself  a  fundamental  factor  of  the  psychic 
procedure.  Peculiarly  prominent  in  all  is  the 
will-like,  consenting  aspect  of  the  incorpora- 
tive  process,  by  virtue  of  its  intimate  affilia- 
tion with  the  personal  flavor  of  conduct,  as 
through  the  selection  and  direction  and  in- 
tegration of  experience,  a  self  emerges,  ma- 
tures and  expands. 

When  the  direction  of  interest  in  subcon- 
scious functioning  is  shaped  towards  an  in- 

46 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

elusion  of  abnormal  relations,  there  are  oth- 
er obligations  to  be  met.  My  exposition  in- 
dicates my  conviction  that  the  conception  thus 
emerging  from  the  study  of  the  normal  legit- 
imately and  fairly  applies  to  the  abnormal 
field.  The  most  instructive  variety  of  the 
domestic  species  revealing  relatively  pro- 
nounced or  independent  subconscious  func- 
tioning, I  find  in  the  diversified  lapses  popu- 
larly termed  absent-mindedness.  Though 
evanescent  and  superficial,  the  disengagement 
of  the  normally  accompanying  "privileges" 
of  complete  consciousness  presented  in  such 
cases,  and  again  their  amenabiHty  to  analysis 
constitutes  this  domain  a  peculiarly  instruc- 
tive example  of  what  is  meant  by  the  subcon- 
scious in  working  trim.  It  is  equally  fortu- 
nate for  the  comprehension  of  the  abnormal 
that  so  intrinsically  abnormal  a  procedure  as 
dreaming  should  be  so  common;  and  this 
both  as  furnishing  a  familiar  alteration  of 
mental  state  (physiologically  conditioned), 
and  as  revealing  the  normality  of  the  easy- 
going, revery-like,  streams  of  mental  occupa- 
tion that  constantly  and  characteristically 
contribute  to  the  psychic  life. 

The  variants  of  dream  states,  the  drug  in- 

47 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

toxications,  trance  and  hypnosis  present  anal- 
ogies of  release,  impairment  and  rearrange- 
ment of  function  in  further  extension  of 
dreaming  and  mental  abstraction.  Abnor- 
mality in  these  regions  is  a  shifting  matter 
and  centers  about  the  orientation  of  the  sub- 
ject to  his  environment.  Such  orientation  is 
variously  interfered  with  by  the  invasions  of 
projections  from  the  inner  world  (analogous 
to  those  of  trance,  hypnosis,  delirium,  drug 
intoxication),  or  by  the  allied  alternations 
and  entanglements  of  rival  syntheses  of  ex- 
perience (multiple  personality  and  the  lilce). 
Such  dissociations  frequently  betray  their  ori- 
gin in  subconsciously  assimilated  experience, 
and  their  growth  by  a  like  disenfranchised 
rumination,  while  differently  instructive,  are 
the  more  sudden  curtailments  of  distortions 
of  orientation  in  disintegrating  lapses,  not 
uncommonly  of  a  "shock"  origin.  Through- 
out this  series  the  type  characteristics  far 
outweigh  in  importance  the  vagaries  of  de- 
tailed manifestations,  while  the  analyses  of 
retention  to  loss,  of  one  conscious  synthesis 
to  its  rival  (notably  in  the  hysterical  anaes- 
thesias) are  peculiarly  significant  in  their  rev- 
elation of  the  standard  modus  operandi  of 

48 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

the  abnormally  subconscious,  of  the  inter- 
course between  dissociated  groupings  of  func- 
tion. 

The  fundamental  difficulties  surrounding 
this  aspect  of  the  conception  are  two:  (i) 
the  synthesizing  of  the  products  of  such  func- 
tioning into  seceding  systems  (not  merely 
sporadic  states)  ;  (2)  with  or  without  such 
synthesis,  the  extreme  elaboration  of  the 
products  in  specialized  directions.  Popularly 
this  dual  difficulty  appears  in  the  willingness 
to  admit  that  absent-mindedness,  dreaming, 
and  simple  suggestion  are  amply  accounted 
for  by  a  normally  related  conception^  of  sub- 


'The  most  baffling  group  of  subconcious  facilities  of 
a  clearly  normal  type  are  the  operations  of  arithmetical 
prodigies  and  related  proficiencies.  The  determination 
of  the  status  of  these  is  a  definite  obligation  which 
psychology  has  not  yet  met.  There  are  beginnings  and 
a  few  notable  analyses;  in  the  main,  the  results  seemed 
to  me  so  unsatisfactory  that  I  was  reluctantly  com- 
pelled to  all  but  omit  them  from  my  survey.  I  believe 
that  in  suitable  cases  the  application  of  the  methods 
used  in  cases  of  shifting  personality,  to  the  procedures 
in  calculating  prodigies,  will  reveal  a  more  intimate 
insight  into  the  subconscious  facilitating  steps,  and  that 
these  will  conform  to  the  general  conception  here  ad- 
vanced. The  investigation  seems  at  all  events  desirable 
and  promising. 

49 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

consciousness,  but  that  trance  states  (like 
those  of  Mile.  Helene  Smith)  and  conflicting 
personalities  (like  the  case  of  Miss  Beau- 
champ)  remain  enigmatic.  Hence  it  is  well 
that  explanation  should  be  addressed  to  the 
rational  or  imaginative  elaboration,  and  to 
the  "doubling"  or  rival,  seceding,  or  de- 
tached synthesis.  The  inherent  difficulty  of 
each  phase  lies  in  its  participation  in  the  oth- 
er. The  creative  effort  in  Mile.  Smith's  Mar- 
tian extravaganza  astonishes  by  its  appear- 
ance as  the  work  of  a  handicapped  phase  of 
her  consciousness;  the  ingenious  tantalizings 
of  "Sally"  are  remarkable  because  directed 
against  and  concealed  from  another  phase  of 
her  being.  Yet  once  the  dissociated-minded- 
ness  be  admitted,  a  further  complexity  of  its 
application  seems  no  serious  obstacle  to  its 
admission;  and  particularly  is  it  to  be  recog- 
nized that  this  pyschic  synthesis  can  not  only 
draw  upon  the  reservoir  of  the  common  con- 
sciousness, but  as  well  assimilate  in  like  par- 
tial incorporation  experiences  of  its  own. 
The  widening  detachment  (doubling)  results 
accordingly  from  the  capacity  of  the  disso- 
ciated consciousness  to  shape  its  orientation 
(not  alone  its  memory  resources)  by  its  own 

50 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

contracted  model.     I  have  attempted  to  show 
that  the  status  thus  resulting  is  of  one  type 
or  another  according  (mainly)  as  the  "fault" 
thus  arising  is  genetic  (Miss  Beauchamp)  or 
is  disintegrating   (Mr.  Hanna), — the  latter 
the  more  suggestive  of  definite  physiological 
variation.     In  each  the  demonstrated  though 
gradual  and  hard-won  fusion  points  to  the 
underlying  unity  despite  temporary  psycho- 
logical (or  physiological)  barrier,  as  do  also 
the  occasional  spontaneous    intercourse    be- 
tween one  realm  and  the  other  and  the  arti- 
ficially encouraged  pour  parlers  upon  a  neu- 
tral ground.     In  fine,  the  added  complication 
of  these  admittedly  perplexing  embodiments 
of  dissociated  functioning  do  not  constitute  a 
warrant  for  a  distinctive  hypothesis,  but  sug- 
gest a  warranted  extension  of  the  conception 
of  dissociation  as  applied  to  more  common 
and  regular  phenomena.     That  the  concep- 
tion of  dissociation  must  be  shaped  to  include 
these  is  obvious;  and  the  chief  importance  of 
further  data  lies  in  the  hope  that  they  may 
render  more  precise  and  explicit  the  connota- 
tion of  that  uniquely  significant  term  in  mod- 
ern psychology. 

While   pleading    for   the    regulative   val- 

51 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ue  of  normal  psychological  conceptions 
for  the  study  of  abnormal  psychology, 
I  am  as  ready  to  derive  from  the  lat- 
ter pertinent  applications  to  the  form- 
er, in  theory  and  practice  alike.  The 
dictum  that  the  grosser  and  more  pronounced 
abnormalities  are  but  common  deficiencies 
writ  large  works  both  ways.  The  frequent 
existence  of  restraining  and  impeding  influ- 
ences of  a  subconscious  order  in  normal  in- 
dividuals follows  directly  from  the  central 
position.  The  release  of  these  by  appropri- 
ate mental  therapeutics  is  thus  justified  as 
practical  procedure  by  reference  to  the  analy- 
ses and  again  to  the  practical  results  in  pro- 
nounced and  wayward  hysteria  and  in  genetic 
and  disintegrating  lapses  of  personality.  In 
such  justification  lies  a  legitimate  phase  of 
popular  and  professional  interest  in  the  con- 
ception of  the  subconscious.  Here  as  else- 
where, wise  practice  will  wait  upon  sound 
theory. 


52 


CHAPTER  FOUR 

BY  PIERRE  JANET 

Professor  of  Psychology,  College  de  France 

YOU  have  set  me  quite  a  difficult 
task  and  one  which  I  hardly  feel 
capable  of  accomplishing  to 
your  entire  satisfaction.  You 
ask  me  to  take  a  stand  with  re- 
gard to  the  metaphysical  theories  which  are 
developing  today  and  which  seem  to  have  for 
their  point  of  departure  the  study  of  phe- 
nomena formerly  described  by  me  under  the 
name  of  the  "Subconscious."  These  studies, 
already  old,  since  I  published  them  between 
the  years  1886  and  1889,  do  not  permit  me 
to  take  part  in  this  serious  quarrel;  they 
have  a  much  more  restricted  and  much  less 
ambitious  range.  While  the  researches  of 
the  present  day,  whether  they  have  a  spirit- 
ualistic or  a  materialistic  tendency,  attain  to 
the  summit  of  the  highest  metaphysics,  my 
old  studies,  very  modest  as  they  were,  simply 
endeavored  to  throw  light  upon,  describe  and 

S2, 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

classify  certain  phenomena  of  pathological 
psychology. 

Disturbances  of  the  notion  of  personality 
are  freely  met  with  in  psychiatric  studies. 
One  finds  not  only  disturbances  in  the  con- 
ception which  patients  make  of  their  own 
person,  when  they  pretend  to  be  a  king  or  an 
animal,  but  also  one  very  often  meets  with 
curious  alterations  in  the  assimilation,  the  in- 
corporation of  such  and  such  a  phenomenon 
with  that  feeling  they  have  of  their  own  per- 
son. Indeed,  it  is  undeniable  that  there  takes 
place  in  us  a  certain  classing  of  psychologic 
phenomena;  some  are  attached  to  the  group 
of  the  phenomena  of  the  outside  world,  oth- 
ers are  grouped  about  the  idea  of  our  per- 
son. This  idea,  whether  exact  or  not,  which 
is  probably  in  a  great  measure  a  product  of 
our  social  education,  becomes  a  center  about 
which  we  range  certain  facts,  while  others  are 
placed  outside  of  ourselves.  Without  discuss- 
ing the  value  and  the  nature  of  this  distribu- 
tion as  it  is  brought  about  in  the  practically 
normal  mind,  I  state  simply  the  fact  that  cer- 
tain patients  attach  badly  to  their  personality 
certain  phenomena,  while  others  do  not  hesi- 
tate to  consider  the  same  facts  as  entirely  per- 

54 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

sonal. 

In  the  delirium  of  typhoid  fever  one  of 
my  patients  used  to  say  to  me :  "Just  think  of 
my  poor  husband  who  has  such  a  frightful 
headache;  see  how  my  children  suffer  in  their 
stomachs,  somebody  is  opening  their  abdo- 
men." She  attributed  to  other  people  the 
sensations  of  suffering  which  ordinarily  we 
do  not  hesitate  to  attribute  to  ourselves.  One 
meets  much  more  often  still  with  a  somewhat 
different  illusion  in  that  large  class  of  pa- 
tients which  I  have  described  under  the  name 
of  "psychasthenics;"  many  of  them  repeat 
incessantly  such  remarks  as,  "It  is  not  I  who 
feel,  it  Is  not  I  who  eat,  it  is  not  I  who  speak, 
it  is  not  I  who  suffer,  it  is  not  I  who  sleep; 
I  am  dead  and  it  is  not  I  who  see  clearly," 
etc.^ 

It  is  easy  to  determine  that  in  these  pa- 
tients their  movements  are  correct,  their  di- 
verse sensations  are  correctly  conserved, 
even  their  kinaesthetic  and  visceral  sensa- 
tions; but  the  subject  nevertheless  declares 
that  he  does  not  attach  them  to  his  personal- 

"Nevroses  et  idees  fixes,  1898,  II,  p.  62;  Obsessions  et 
psychasthenic,  1903,  I,  pp.  28  et  307,  II,  p.  40,  351. 

55 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ity;  as  far  as  he  may  he  acts  as  if  he  did 
not  have  them  at  the  disposition  of  his  per- 
son. A  patient  of  this  sort,  recently  de- 
scribed by  Seglas,  declared  that  he  had  no 
memory  and  acted  as  far  as  possible  as  if  he 
had  really  lost  all  memory,  although  it  was 
easy  to  prove  that  he  had  in  reality  forgotten 
nothing.^  The  apparent  trouble  of  memory 
just  as  the  apparent  antecedent  trouble  of 
sensation  and  movement  was  nothing  more 
than  a  disturbance  in  the  development  of  the 
idea  and  the  feeling  of  the  personality. 

Among  these  psychasthenics  the  disturb- 
ance of  the  personality  is  not  total.  It  is 
clearly  manifest  in  certain  mental  operations 
which  may  aptly  be  called  superior, — that  is 
to  say,  in  the  judgment  of  recognition  by 
which  the  attention  attaches  the  new  mental 
content  to  the  old,  in  language  with  reflection 
and  in  voluntary  action.  But  elementary  op- 
erations of  the  personality  seem  to  be  pre- 
served; consciousness,  that  act  by  which  a 
multiplicity  and  diversity  of  states  is  attached 
to  a  unity,  seems  to  survive.  The  subject  de- 
clares that  it  is  not  he  who  remembers  this 

^Journal    de    psychologic    normale    et    pathalogique, 
March,  1907,  p.  97. 

56 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

or  that  act,  that  it  is  not  he  who  sees  this  or 
that  tree,  but  he  remembers  it  nevertheless 
and  continues  to  see  it.  At  least  it  is  manifest 
to  us  that  his  mind  continues  to  see  the  tree, 
since  he  describes  the  changes  which  takes 
place  in  it  and  tells  us :  "The  tree  is  green,  its 
leaves  flutter,  but  it  is  not  I  who  see  it."  The 
disturbance  of  the  personal  perception  ap- 
pears not  to  be  profound. 

This  incomplete  character  of  the  disturb- 
ances of  the  personality  is  found  in  all  the  ac- 
cidents of  these  psychasthenic  patients;  they 
have  obsessions  but  are  not  completely  insane 
and  always  recognize  the  absurdity  of  their 
obsessing  ideas;  they  have  impulses  but  do 
not  carry  them  out;  they  have  phobias  con- 
cerning acts  but  never  real  inability  to  per- 
form acts,  or  real  paralyses;  they  have  inter- 
minable doubts  but  no  true  amnesias.  It  is 
the  striking  trait  of  their  character  that  they 
never  have  any  symptom  in  its  completeness, 
and  this  incomplete  character  of  the  disturb- 
ances of  their  personality  falls  within  a  gen- 
eral law. 

Now  there  is  another  psychosis,  all  the 
symptoms  of  which  might  easily  be  put  in  a 
parallel  column  with  those  of  psychasthenics, 

57 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

and  that  is  hysteria.  This  mental  disease  has 
for  its  essential  characteristic  exaggeration, 
the  carrying  to  an  extreme  of  all  preceding 
symptoms.  Instead  of  the  preceding  obses- 
sions with  doubt,  there  are  in  the  mono-deis- 
tic  somnambulism  of  hysterics  fixed  ideas 
which  develop  to  the  most  extreme  degree, 
with  complete  hallucinations  and  impulses;  in 
place  of  doubt  there  is  true  amnesia ;  in  place 
of  phobias  we  meet  with  complete  paralyses. 
It  is,  therefore,  interesting  to  see  the  form 
which  the  trouble  of  the  personality,  just  de- 
scribed as  incomplete  in  the  previously  men- 
tioned disease,  will  take  in  hysteria. 

Doubtless  certain  hysterics  at  times  ex- 
press, with  regard  to  certain  sensations,  judg- 
ments analogous  to  those  of  psychasthenics. 

A  patient  formerly  cited  by  Professor 
James  used  to  say:  "My  arm  is  no  longer  a 
part  of  me,  it  is  foreign  to  me,  it  is  an  old 
stump."  This,  however,  is  rather  exception- 
al and  most  commonly  one  meets  with  a  dif- 
ferent order  of  facts.  In  the  wake  of  certain 
crises  in  which  fixed  ideas  have  developed 
superabundantly  and  completely  in  the  form 
of  feelings,  acts  and  hallucinations,  which  we 
have    called    mono-idelstic    somnambulisms, 

58 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

the  patient  acts  as  if  he  were  completely  ig- 
norant of  what  has  taken  place;  he  does  not 
doubt  his  memories,  he  does  not  declare  them 
foreign  to  his  person;  he  does  not  speak  of 
them  at  all,  he  ignores  them.  The  same  sub- 
ject has  both  legs  paralyzed  for  certain  per- 
iods of  time,  and  yet  he  does  not  merely  say 
that  it  is  not  he  who  walks,  he  does  not  walk 
at  all.  If  one  pricks  or  pinches  his  motion- 
less legs,  he  does  not  merely  say  that  the  sen- 
sation is  foreign  to  him,  that  it  no  longer  be- 
longs to  him,  that  it  is  not  he  who  feels;  he 
says  nothing  at  all,  for  he  does  not  seem  to 
feel  it  in  any  way.  The  loss  which  the  per- 
sonality suffers,  the  alienation  of  the  phenom- 
ena seems  to  be  more  complete  than  in  the 
preceding  case.  Shall  we  say,  however,  that 
the  cases  are  in  nowise  comparable? 

The  psychasthenic  still  retained  his  mem- 
ories, his  voluntary  acts,  his  sensations.  It 
is  true  that  he  said,  "It  is  not  I  who  remem- 
ber, I  who  move  and  feel,"  but  he  proved 
that  he  did  feel  by  describing  correctly  ob- 
jects placed  before  him. 

In  the  hysteric  these  psychologic  phenom- 
ena are  merely  suppressed,  it  is  quite  another 
disease,  and  that  is  exactly  what  I  formerly 

59 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

tried  to  show,  although  in  opposition  to  the 
opinion  current  at  that  time.  With  a  little 
more  precaution  than  is  necessary  with  the 
psychasthenic  but  in  the  same  way,  by  more 
carefully  avoiding  attracting  of  the  patient  to 
the  expression  of  these  phenomena,  one  may 
demonstrate  perfectly  their  existence  in  as 
complete  a  form  as  in  the  so-called  normal 
individual.  Take  the  case  of  a  young  girl  of 
twenty  years  who  in  her  somnambulistic  per- 
iods indulges  in  fugues  of  several  days'  dura- 
tion, far  from  the  paternal  roof.  After  her 
fugues  she  appears  to  have  lost  completely 
all  memory  of  them,  although  she  seems  in- 
capable of  telling  you  why  she  went  away  or 
where  she  went.  Under  distraction  and  while 
she  was  thinking  of  something  else,  I  put  a 
pencil  in  her  right  hand  and  she  wrote  me 
the  following  letter  apparently  without  cog- 
nizance of  what  she  was  doing. — ^"I  left 
home  because  mamma  accuses  me  of  having 
a  lover  and  it  is  not  true.  I  cannot  live  with 
her  any  longer.  I  sold  my  jewels  to  pay  my 
railroad  fare.  I  took  such  and  such  a  train," 
etc.  In  this  letter  she  relates  her  entire 
fugue  with  precision  although  she  continues 
to  contend  that  she  remembers  nothing  about 

60 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

it.  Another  case,  that  of  a  man  who  seemed 
to  have  both  legs  paralyzed,  rapidly  tra- 
verses roofs  during  a  somnambulism  and 
even  during  the  waking  state  makes  with  his 
limbs  any  movements  one  desires,  if  such 
movements  are  called  for  under  favorable 
conditions.  These  people  who  seem  not  to 
see  clearly  or  not  to  feel  anything  in  their 
hands,  describe  to  you  in  a  subsequent  som- 
nambulism or  by  means  of  the  writing  of 
which  I  have  just  spoken,  or  by  still  other 
methods,  all  the  details  of  objects  placed  be- 
fore their  eyes  or  brought  in  contact  with 
their  hands.  Are  we  not  obliged  to  conclude 
as  in  the  preceding  case,  that  sensations  are 
really  conserved,  although  the  subject  tells 
us  that  he  does  not  feel  them?  These  are  in- 
teresting though  perfectly  commonplace  clini- 
cal phenomena,  since  it  is  easy  to  see  that  all 
hysterical  accidents  are  fashioned  on  the 
same  model.  They  are  analogous  to  the  de- 
personalizations of  psychasthenics,  but  they 
are  not  identical  with  them.  I  tried  to  sum 
them  up  under  the  word  "subconscious," 
which,  from  my  point  of  view,  simply  desig- 
nates this  new  form  of  the  disease  of  the 
personality. 

6i 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

Since  the  time  when  I  first  began  to  employ 
the  word  "subconscious,"  in  this  purely  clini- 
cal and  somewhat  prosaic  sense,  I  must  ad- 
mit that  other  authors  have  employed  the 
same  word  in  a  sense  infinitely  more  ambi- 
tious. The  word  has  been  used  to  designate 
marvelous  activities  which  exist,  so  it  ap- 
pears, within  ourselves  without  our  even  sus- 
pecting their  existence,  and  which  become  the 
source  of  our  virtues,  of  our  enthusiasms  and 
of  the  divination  of  genius.  This  recalls  that 
amusing  saying  of  Hartmann:  "Let  us  not 
despair  at  having  a  mind  so  practical  and  so 
lowly,  so  unpoetical  and  so  little  spiritual; 
there  is  within  the  innermost  sanctuary  of 
each  of  us,  a  marvelous  something  of  which 
we  are  unconscious,  which  dreams  and  prays 
while  we  labor  to  earn  our  daily  bread."  1 
intentionally  avoid  discussing  theories  so  con- 
soling and  perhaps  true  withal;  I  simply  re- 
mind myself  that  I  have  something  quite  dif- 
ferent to  do.  The  poor  patients  whom  I 
studied  had  no  genius;  the  phenomena  which 
had  become  subconscious  with  them  were 
very  simple  phenomena,  such  as  among  other 
men  are  a  part  of  their  personal  conscious- 
ness and  excite  no  wonder.     They  had  lost 

62 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

the  power  to  will  and  the  knowledge  of  self 
they  had  a  disease  of  the  personality,  nothing 
more. 

In  connection  with  these  same  facts  and  in 
making  use  of  the  same  word,  their  theories 
have  touched  the  great  problem  of  the  con- 
nections between  soul  and  body,  between 
thought  and  brain.  Are  cerebral  phenomena 
always  accompanied  by  psychologic  phenom- 
ena? When  psychologic  phenomena  dimin- 
ish, when  they  are  reduced  to  their  simplest 
expression  do  they  not  tend  to  disappear,  and 
may  not  one  then  say  that  nervous  phenom- 
ena subsist  alone?  May  not  certain  coordi- 
nate movements  which  are  but  ill  perceived 
by  patients  during  their  convulsions,  and  in 
choreas,  be  attributed  to  simple  cerebral 
phenomena  without  interjecting  the  notion  of 
psychologic  phenomena?  If  we  were  really 
determined  to  baptize  these  physiologic  phe- 
nomena without  thought  of  the  name  subcon- 
scious, might  we  not  on  account  of  the  anal- 
ogy of  the  name  say  that  all  the  phenomena 
of  somnambulism  or  of  automatic  writing  is 
easily  explainable  "by  phosphorescent  shad- 
ows which  flit  across  certain  centers  of  the 
cerebral  cortex" ! 

63 


Subconscious  phenomena 

Far  be  it  from  me  to  discuss  these  fine 
theories  which  seduce  certain  minds  by  their 
scientific  appearance,  and  which  after  all  do 
probably  contain  some  truth.  I  am  content 
to  remark,  that  that  is  quite  another  problem 
Doubtless  the  question  of  the  connections  be- 
tween thought  and  brain  may  be  discussed 
with  regard  to  somnambulism  as  well  as  with 
regard  to  nearly  every  fact  of  normal  life, 
but  in  my  opinion  there  is  no  good  reason 
why  this  great  problem  should  be  particu- 
larly raised  in  this  connection.  The  assimi- 
lation of  the  conduct  of  the  somnambulist,  of 
the  execution  of  the  suggestion,  of  a  page  of 
automatic  writing,  with  incoordinate  convul- 
sive movements  is  pure  childishness.  These 
diverse  acts  are  identical  with  those  which 
we  are  accustomed  to  observe  in  persons  like 
ourselves  and  to  explain  by  the  intervention 
of  the  intelligence.  Undoubtedly  one  may 
say  that  a  somnambulist  is  only  a  mechanical 
doll,  but  then  we  must  say  the  same  of  every 
creature.  These  are  useless  reveries.  In  our 
ignorance,  we  simply  know  that  certain  com- 
plex facts,  like  an  intelligent  reply  to  a  ques- 
tion, depend  upon  two  things  which  we  be- 
lieve associated;  superior  cerebral  mechan- 

64 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ism  and  a  phenomenon  which  we  call  an  effect 
of  consciousness.  We  find  the  same  charac- 
teristics in  the  so-called  subconscious  phe- 
nomena, and  we  must  suppose  back  of  them 
the  same  two  conditions.  To  be  able  to  af- 
firm anything  else  we  should  need  to  possess 
precise  knowledge  concerning  the  expression 
of  superior  or  inferior  phenomena  of  cere- 
bral activity,  concerning  the  loss  of  the  asso- 
ciation of  consciousness  with  cerebral  phe- 
nomena, knowledge  which  we  positively  do 
not  possess.  Certainly  it  ought  not  to  be 
with  regard  to  half  understood  symptoms  of 
a  mental  disease  that  we  should  try  to  resolve 
these  great  problems  of  metaphysics.  In  my 
opinion,  we  have  got  other  psychologic  and 
clinical  problems  to  resolve  concerning  the 
subconscious  without  embarrassing  ourselves 
with  these  speculations.  You  see  that  I  am 
today  more  occupied  than  formerly  with  the 
relations  which  exist  between  the  depersonal- 
ization of  psychasthenics  and  the  subcon- 
sciouness  of  hysterics.  We  must  study  the 
intermediate  types  which  are  met  with  much 
oftener  than  I  had  thought.  It  is  necessary 
to  determine  if  certain  characteristics  of  the 
one  disease  are  not  found  in  the  other.    Does 

6s 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

not  the  hysteric  herself  possess  a  sort  of  in- 
sane belief  which  makes  her  relinquish  cer- 
tain phenomena?  Up  to  what  point  is  she 
sincere  in  her  declarations  of  ignorance? 
Does  she  not  to  a  certain  extent  deceive  her- 
self? By  what  steps  does  she  arrive  at  the 
complete  separation  of  phenomena  which 
seem  to  exist  in  certain  cases?  Do  the  psy- 
chologic phenomena  thus  dissociated  always 
retain  their  properties,  are  they  not  more  or 
less  transformed?  The  same  problem  pre- 
sents itself  in  connection  with  the  muscular 
phenomena,  for  in  the  hysterical  contracture 
it  does  not  seem  to  me  exact  to  say  that  the 
muscular  contraction  remains  absolutely  what 
it  was  in  normal  movements.  There  are 
many  other  clinical  problems  of  great  import- 
ance which  it  seems  to  me  must  be  studied 
None  of  these  researches  can  be  made  with- 
out exact  and  long  continued  observations 
carried  on  under  good  conditions,  and  the 
very  least  of  them  is  to  my  mind  more  im- 
portant than  all  the  huge  tomes  full  of  spec- 
ulations put  together.  It  seems  to  me  not 
difficult  to  gather  from  these  few  reflections 
the  reply  to  your  questions,  or,  at  least,  to 

66 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

certain  of  them.^ 

[i.  What  do  you  understand  by  the  "Sub- 
conscious?"] 

The  word  "subconscious"  is  the  name  giv- 
en to  the  particular  form  which  disease  of  the 
personality  takes  in  hysteria. 

[2.  Does  "doubling"  (Janet)  of  con- 
sciousness ever  occur  whether  normally  or 
pathologically?  If  not,  how  would  you  ex- 
plain the  various  so-called  subconscious  phe- 
nomena of  abnormal  psychology  (automatic 
writing,  speech,  etc.)]? 

This  word  is  not  a  philosophical  explana- 
tion; it  is  a  simple  clinical  observation  of  a 
common  character  which  these  phenomena 
present. 

[3.  Does  the  subconscious  always  repre- 
sent or  depend  upon  the  doubling  of  con- 
sciousness? If  so,  must  there  be  a  lack  of 
awareness  on  the  part  of  the  personal  con- 

*A  series  of  ten  questions  were  sent  to  each  con- 
tributor to  this  symposium,  suggesting  points  on  which 
it  was  thought  desirable  to  obtain  expressions  of  views 
and  to  keep  the  discussion  within  certain  Hmits.  Pro- 
fessor Janet  concludes  with  answers  to  eight  of  these 
questions.  I  have  interpolated  each  question  in  brackets 
in  his  article  before  the  answer  in  order  that  the  latter 
may  be  understood. — Editor. 

67 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

sciousness  for  the  second  dissociated  group 
of  ideas?] 

There  exist  all  sorts  of  intermediate  path- 
ologic forms  between  the  doubt  of  the  psy- 
chasthenic and  the  subconsciousness  of  the 
hysteric. 

[4.  Is  there  normally  in  every  individual 
a  second  group  of  co-acting  ideas  of  which 
the  individual  is  not  aware  (a  so-called  sec- 
ondary consciousness)  ?  If  so,  are  such  ideas 
discreet  or  systematized?] 

It  is  possible,  for  all  pathologic  phenom- 
ena have  their  germ  in  normal  physiology. 

[5.  If  doubling  occurs,  is  it  always  patho- 
logical? If  so,  how  do  you  explain  automatic 
writing,  post-hypnotic  phenomena,  like  un- 
conscious solutions  of  arithmetical  problems 
and  similar  phenomena  in  normal  people?] 

Clear-cut  phenomena  truly  comparable  to 
the  subconsciousness  of  hysterics  are  infinite- 
ly rare  in  the  normal  mind.  When  they  are 
really  noted  by  competent  observers  they 
must  be  regarded  as  unhealthy  accidents  of  a 
more  or  less  transient  character,  and  in  gen- 
eral, as  I  have  always  observed,  of  a  some- 
what sinister  omen. 

Furthermore,    these    discussions    of    the 

68 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

words,  health  and  disease  are  absolutely  puer- 
ile and  recall  the  sophism  of  the  Greeks  about 
the  bald-headed  man.  A  phenomenon  is  mor- 
bid when  it  is  most  often  associated  with  oth- 
er symptoms  of  a  well  recognized  disease 
and  when  it  disappears  with  the  disease.  Such 
indeed  is  the  characteristic  feature  of  som- 
nambulism and  of  automatic  writing,  which 
can  no  longer  be  evoked  in  hysterics  when 
they  recover  from  their  disease. 

[6.  Do  you  include  under  the  term  sub- 
conscious all  conscious  experiences  that  have 
been  forgotten,  and  which  are  capable  of  be- 
ing synthesized  with  the  personal  conscious- 
ness at  any  given  moment  regardless  of 
whether  the  forgotten  experiences  are  co-act- 
ing or  not  (Sidis)  ?  (In  this  case  subcon- 
sciousness becomes  co-extensive  with  the  for- 
gotten and  out  of  mind.)  ] 

It  seems  to  me  difficult  to  reply  to  this 
question  when  we  know  so  little  concerning 
the  form  in  which  our  memories  are  pre- 
served when  they  are  not  called  forth. 

[7.  Do  you  limit  the  term  solely  to  the 
conscious  states  which  are  in  co-activity  at 
any  given  moment,  but  of  which  the  subject 
is  not  aware?] 

69 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

The  word  "subconscious"  seems  to  me 
rather  to  apply  to  this  more  clearly  cut  case. 

[8.  Do  you  base  the  conception  of  the 
subconscious  on  the  fact  of  awareness  on  the 
part  of  the  individual  for  certain  conscious 
states,  so  that  there  would  be  different  de- 
grees of  subconsciousness  corresponding  to 
different  degrees  of  awareness?  For  exam- 
ple, as  in  absent-mindedness  and  as  repre- 
sented by  the  theory  of  the  "fringe  of  the  fo- 
cus of  consciousness."] 

There  are  evidently  relations  between  all 
these  phenomena,  but  we  must  avoid  con- 
founding them  with  one  another;  analysis 
compels  us  to  establish  some  discontinuity  be- 
tween the  facts. 

So  here,  my  dear  Dr.  Prince,  you  have  the 
answers  requested.  I  fear  that  they  will 
hardly  satisfy  your  readers.  An  investiga- 
tion of  this  sort  does  not  resolve  the  prob- 
lems once  and  for  all;  it  merely  brings  the 
different  opinions  into  competition  as  they 
were  before.  I  hope  that  it  may  interest  at 
least  some  few  and  lead  them  to  psychologi- 
cal observations  which  will  be  of  lasting  util- 
ity to  science. 


70 


CHAPTER  FIVE 

BY  MORTON  PRINCE 

Professor  of  Neurology,  Tufts  College  Med- 
ical School 

IN  the  prefatory  note  to  this  symposium 
six  different  meanings  in  which  the 
term  "subconscious"  is  nowadays  used 
were  defined.  All  but  the  first  and 
fourth  of  these  meanings  involve  dif- 
ferent interpretations  of  the  same  observed 
facts.  In  a  symposium  of  this  kind  three  of 
these  only  need  to  be  considered;  namely, 
those  which  Professor  Miinsterberg  has  so 
clearly  distinguished  and  explained,  as  the 
points  of  view  of  the  layman,  the  physician 
and  the  theoretical  psychologist.  As  the 
first  of  these  three  hangs  upon  the  validity  of 
the  second,  we  need  only  take  up  for  discus- 
sion the  two  last.  These  two  offer  interpre- 
tations of  facts  which  are  not  in  dispute.  Let 
me  state  over  again  the  problem : 

According  to  the  first  of  these  two  inter- 
pretations (Professor  Miinsterberg's  and  my 

71 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

second  type),  so-called  automatic  writing  and 
speech,  post-hypnotic  phenomena  like  the  so- 
lution of  arithmetical  problems  and  various 
abnormal  phenomena,  of  the  origin  of  all 
which  the  subject  Is  Ignorant,  are  the  mani- 
festations of  dissociated  Ideas  of  which  the 
subject  is  unaware  and  which  are  therefore 
called  subconscious.  Thus  a  "doubling"  of 
consciousness  results  consisting  of  the  per- 
sonal self  and  the  subconscious  Ideas.  I  pre- 
fer myself  the  term  co-conscious  to  subcon- 
scious, partly  to  express  the  notion  of  co-ac- 
tivity of  a  second  co-consciousness,  partly  to 
avoid  the  ambiguity  of  the  conventional  term 
due  to  its  many  meanings,  and  partly  because 
such  Ideas  are  not  necessarily  5MZ?-conscIous 
at  all;  that  Is,  there  may  be  no  lack  of  aware- 
ness of  them.  The  co-conscious  Ideas  may 
be  very  elementary  and  consist  only  of  sensa- 
tions and  perceptions  which  have  been  split 
off  from  the  personal  consciousness,  as  In 
hysterical  anesthesiae,  or  they  may  consist  of 
recurring  memories  of  past  experiences.  Un- 
der certain  conditions  by  a  process  of  synthe- 
sizing these  Ideas  and  assimilation  of  them 
with  a  greater  or  less  amount  of  the  personal 
self,  which  is  thereby  attenuated.  In  its  facul-( 

72 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ties,  quite  large  dissociated  systems  of  sub- 
conscious ideas  may  be  formed  and  give  rise 
to  the  complicated  phenomena  for  which  an 
interpretation  is  desired. 

According  to  the  opposing  hypothesis,  all 
these  phenomena  are  explainable  as  the  man- 
ifestations of  pure  physiological  processes  un- 
accompanied by  ideas.  The  apparently  intel- 
lectual and  purposive  acts  as  well  as  volition 
and  memory  are  performed  by  brain  pro- 
cesses alone  to  which  no  consciousness  be- 
longs. Such  acts  differ  only  in  complexity 
from  such  other  physiological  processes 
which  carry  on  the  digestion  and  other  func- 
tions of  the  body,  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
spasmodic  jerkings  and  twitchings,  seen  in 
chorea,  epilepsy  and  other  abnormal  affec- 
tions, on  the  other.  "Unconscious  cerebra- 
tion. Carpenter  called  it  years  ago.  Which 
of  these  two  interpretations  is  correct?  Pro- 
fessor Miinsterberg  is  absolutely  right  in 
saying  "no  fact  of  abnormal  experience  can 
by  itself  prove  that  a  psychological  and  not  a 
physiological  explanation  is  needed;  it  is  a 
philosophical  problem  which  must  be  settled 
by  principle  before  the  explanation  of  the 
special  facts  begins."     The  principle  is  the 

73 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

existence  of  dissociated   subconscious   ideas. 
Are  there  such  things? 

With  the  meaning  of  this  problem  well  be- 
fore the  mind  it  becomes  manifest  that  be- 
fore the  fundamental  principle  of  dissociated 
ideas  is  definitely  established,  it  is  the  sheer- 
est waste  of  time  to  discuss  larger  problems, 
such  as  the  extent  of  the  subconscious  symp- 
toms, whether  they  belong  to  the  normal  as 
well  as  the  abnormal  mind,  whether  they 
form  a  "self,"  a  secondary  self  (third  mean- 
ing), etc.  These  and  others  are  important 
but  secondary  problems.  Above  all  is  it  a 
wasteful  expenditure  of  intellectual  energy  to 
indulge  in  metaphysical  speculations  regard- 
ing the  existence  and  functions  of  a  mystical 
subliminal  self  (Myers),  transcending  as  it 
does  all  experience  and  everything  that  even 
a  "subconscious  self"  can  experience.  The 
point  then  which  we  have  to  determine  at  the 
very  beginning  of  the  inquiry  is  this :  Do  ideas 
ever  occur  outside  the  synthesis  of  the  per- 
sonal self-consciousness  under  any  conditions, 
whether  of  normal  or  abnormal  life,  so  that 
the  subject  becomes  unaware  of  these?  Or, 
putting  the  question  in  the  form  in  which  it 
is  prescribed  to  the  experimenter:    Do  phe- 

74 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

nomena  which  appear  to  be  the  manifesta- 
tions of  a  subconscious  intelligence  necessi- 
tate the  postulation  of  dissociated  Ideas,  or 
are  these  phenomena  compatible  with  the  in- 
terpretation that  they  are  due  to  pure  physio- 
logical processes  without  psychical  corre- 
lates? 


75 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


The  only  grounds  which  I  have  for  believ- 
ing that  my  fellow  beings  have  thoughts  like 
myself  are  that  their  actions  are  like  my  own 
exhibit  intelligence  like  my  own,  and  when  I 
ask  them  they  tell  me  they  have  conscious- 
ness, which  as  described  is  like  my  own.  Now, 
when  I  observe  the  so-called  automatic  ac- 
tions, I  find  that  they  are  of  a  similar  charac- 
ter, and  when  I  ask  of  whatever  it  is  that 
performs  these  actions,  Whether  it  is  con- 
scious or  not?  the  written  or  spoken  reply  is, 
that  it  is  and  that  consciously  it  feels,  thinks 
and  wills  the  actions,  etc.  The  evidence  be- 
ing the  same  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other, 
the  presumption  is  that  the  automatic  intelli- 
gence is  as  conscious  as  the  personal  intelli- 
gence. The  alternative  interpretation  is,  not 
that  a  physiological  process  is  lying,  because 
lying  connotes  ideas,  but  that  in  some  way  it 
is  able  to  rearrange  itself  and  react  to  anoth- 
er person's  ideas  expressed  through  spoken 
language  exactly  in  the  same  way  that  a  con- 
scious intelligence  lies ! 


76 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


The  phenomena  which  occur  in  the  neatest 
and  most  precise  form  and  which,  from  the 
fact  that  they  can  be  induced,  modified  and 
examined  at  will,  are  best  adapted  for  experi- 
mental study,  are  so  called  automatic  writing 
and  speech.  We  will  therefore  take  these 
for  examination  and  see  if  they  ever  require 
the  interpretation  of  a  secondary  intelligence 
of  a  psychical  nature. 

When  automatic  writing  is  produced  in 
its  mostly  highly  developed  form,  the  subject 
with  absolutely  unclouded  mind,  with  all  his 
senses  about  him  is  able  to  orient,  think  and 
reason  as  if  nothing  unusual  is  occurring.  He 
may  watch  with  unconcerned  curiosity  the  va- 
garies of  the  writing  pencil.  In  other  words, 
he  is  in  possession  of  his  normal  waking  intel- 
ligence. Meanwhile  his  hand  automatically 
produces  perhaps  long  discourses  of  diverse 
content.  But  he  is  entirely  unaware  of  what 
his  hand  is  writing  and  his  first  knowledge  of 
its  content  comes  after  reading  the  manu- 
script. We  then  have  intelligence  No.  i  and 
writing  manifestations  which  may  or  may  not 
be  interpreted  as  having  been  produced  by  a 

77 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

conscious  intelligence  No.  2.  But  writing  of 
this  sort  is  not  always  produced  with  intelli- 
gence No.  I  as  alert  as  this. 

On  the  contrary,  often  and  perhaps  most 
frequently  the  writer  falls  into  a  drowsy  con- 
dition in  which  he  imperfectly  orients  his 
surroundings,  and  if  he  is  reading  aloud  ac- 
cording to  the  common  method  of  conducting 
the  experiment,  he  is  only  dimly  conscious  of 
what  he  is  reading.  This  extinguishing  of 
consciousness  in  intelligence  No.  i  may  go 
further  and  he  may  not  hear  when  spoken  to 
or  feel  when  touched.  He  reads  on  mechan- 
ically and  without  consciousness  of  the  mat- 
ter he  is  reading.  In  other  words,  he  has  be- 
come deaf  and  tactually  anesthetic  and  blind 
to  everything  but  the  printed  characters  on 
the  page  before  him,  and  for  even  these 
mind-blind.  In  this  state  then  there  is  prac- 
tically extinguishment  of  all  sense  perceptions 
and  intellectual  thought,  and  finally  the  im- 
pairment of  consciousness  may  be  carried  so 
far  that  he  actually  goes  to  sleep.  Ask  intel- 
ligence No.  2  what  has  become  of  No.  i,  and 
the  answer  may  be,  "He  has  gone  to  sleep.'" 

'This  answer  was  given  by  a  subject  observed  while 
this  paper  was  being  prepared. 

78 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

In  other  words,  intelligence  No.  i  has 
disappeared,  but  intelligence  No.  2  contin- 
ues. 

Now  to  interpret  the  automatic  writing 
produced  when  this  great  impairment  of  in- 
telligence No.  I  has  taken  place  as  subcon- 
scious phenomena  and  due  to  subconscious  in- 
telligence whether  physiological  or  psycho- 
logical is  to  overlook  the  facts  as  presented. 
These  are  not  phenomena  of  a  subconscious 
intelligence  but  of  an  alternating  intelligence 
or  personality.  The  complete  suppression  of 
intelligence  No.  i  has  left  but  one  intelli- 
gence, that  which  had  been  under  other  con- 
ditions intelligence  No.  2.  Unless  the  phy- 
siological interpretation  be  maintained  the 
writing  has  ceased  to  be  automatic  in  the 
sense  in  which  the  term  was  originally  used 
and  has  become  what,  for  the  time  being,  is 
the  primary  intelligence  although  a  different 
one  from  that  which  was  originally  awake. 
I  say  different  because  if  we  examine  the  con- 
tent of  the  writing  we  may  find  it  is  made  up 
of  memories  of  past  experiences  which  were 
entirely  forgotten  by  the  original  intelligence 
No.  I  and  gives  evidence  of  a  personality  dif- 
fering   in    character,    volitions,    sentiment, 

79 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

moods  and  points  of  view,  of  a  character  dif- 
fering in  a  large  degree  from  that  of  the 
waking  intelligence.  The  writing  may  be  an 
original  composition  involving  thought  and 
reason  comparable  to  that  exhibited  by  a  nor- 
mal mind.  Such  compositions  are  of  great 
interest  from  the  light  they  throw  upon  the 
origin  and  development  of  secondary  per- 
sonalities, but  with  that  we  have  nothing  to 
do  here.  At  present  the  only  interest  we 
have  in  such  compositions  is  the  evidence 
which  they  offer  for  the  interpretation  of 
such  a  personality.  That  is  to  say,  whether 
its  intelligence  is  the  exhibition  of  physiolog- 
ical or  psychological  processes.  To  arrive  at 
a  satisfactory  interpretation,  we  must  study 
the  behavior  of  the  personality  to  its  environ- 
ment. If  we  speak  to  it,  it  answers  intelli- 
gently in  writing,  though  intelligence  No.  i 
fails  to  respond.  If  we  prick  the  hand,  we 
obtain  a  similar  response  and  lack  of  re- 
sponse from  intelligence  No.  2  and  No.  i  re- 
spectively, and  the  same  with  the  other 
senses.  It  exhibits  spontaneity  of  thought  and 
its  faculties  are  curtailed  in  the  motor  sphere 
alone  in  which    it  retains    power    only    to 

80 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

move  the  muscles  of  the  arm  and  hand;* 
but  even  here  in  the  motor  sphere  its  facul- 
ties are  not  necessarily  so  limited  for  it  may 
break  out  into  speech  and  may  exhibit  various 
sporadic  movements.  It  has  lost  only  a  gen- 
eral coordinating  control  over  the  whole 
body.  In  the  motor  sphere,  therefore,  its 
loss  is  not  so  great  as  that  which  has  befallen 
intelligence  No.  i.  In  fact,  we  have  here  a 
condition  very  similar  to  that  of  some  per- 
sons in  deep  hypnosis.  The  main  point  is  that 
now  we  have  to  do  with  an  alternating  intelli- 
gence, not  a  co-intelligence.  Is  it  an  alternat- 
ing consciousness? 

The  next  thing  to  note  is  that  in  passing 
from  automatic  writing,  which  is  performed 
while  inteUigence  No.  i  is  completely  alert, 
to  writing  which  is  performed  while  this  in- 
telligence is  completely  or  nearly  extin- 
guished, we  pass  through  insensible  grada- 
tions from  one  condition  to  the  other  and 
we  must  infer  that  the  intelligence  must  he 

*By  this  is  not  meant  that  it  has  the  same  degree  of 
knowledge  and  capacity  for  intellectual  thought  pos- 
sessed by  the  original  personality,  No.  i,  but  only  that 
it  has  all  the  different  kinds  of  intelligence  possessed 
by  a  normal  person. 

8i 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

the  same  in  kind,  physiological  or  psychologi- 
cal,which  produced  the  writing  in  the  one  case 
as  in  the  other.  If  the  alternating  intelli- 
gence in  the  latter  case  is  psychological,  the 
subconscious  intelligence  in  the  former  must 
be  the  same,  for  there  is  no  place  where  we 
can  stop  and  conclude — here  the  physiologi- 
cal ends  and  the  psychological  begins. 

In  the  alternating  intelligence  producing 
automatic  writing  we  have  an  alternating  per- 
sonality. We  have  here  substantially  the 
same  condition  that  is  observed,  first,  in  some 
hpynotic  states;  second,  trance  states;  third, 
"fugues,"  spontaneous  somnambulism  and 
post-epileptic  states;  fourth  a  state  not  very 
different  from  normal  sleep  with  dreams,  for- 
gotten on  waking;  and  fifth,  certain  states  of 
deep  abstraction.  In  none  of  these  has  there 
ever  been  raised  the  doubt  as  to  the  con- 
scious character  of  the  intelligence.  All  are 
"alternating"  states  and  some  are  alternating 
personalities.  In  the  first  group,  suggestions 
requiring  conscious  intelligence  are  compre- 
hended, remembered  and  acted  upon;  in  the 
second,  writing  and  speech  are  manifested 
which  can  only  be  interpreted  as  the  product 
of  thought;  in  the    third  and    fourth,    the 

82 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

thoughts  and  dreams  can  afterwards  be  re- 
gained by  certain  technical  devices;  and  in  the 
last  the  conscious  processes  are  remembered. 


83 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


Let  us  go  further  with  our  experiment  and 
take  a  case  exhibiting  automatic  writing 
where  inteUigence  No.  i  remains  unimpaired. 
We  hypnotize  such  a  subject.  When  asked 
what  sort  of  intelligence  it  was  that  did  the 
writing,  he  replies  that  he  remembers  perfect- 
ly the  thoughts,  sensations  and  the  feelings 
which  made  up  the  consciousness  of  which  in- 
telligence No.  I  was  not  aware  and  that  this 
consciousness  did  the  writing.  Still,  it  may  be 
maintained  that  this  in  itself  is  not  proof 
but  that  the  hypothesis  is  permissible,  that 
these  memories  are  sort  of  hallucinations, 
and  that  in  hypnosis  what  were  previously 
physiological  processes  now  have  become  re- 
awakened and  have  given  rise  in  the  hypnotic 
synthesis  to  psychical  memories.  We  shall 
then  have  to  go  further  and  seek  for  addi- 
tional evidence. 


84 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


Automatic  writers  may  be  divided  into  two 
classes;  namely,  those  who  at  the  moment  of 
writing  are  entirely  unaware  of  what  the 
hand  is  writing;  and  those  in  whom  at  the 
moment  of  writing  ideas  corresponding  to 
written  words  surge  apparently  from  no- 
where without  logical  associative  relation  in- 
to the  mind,  Mrs.  H.,  for  example,  is  an  ex- 
cellent automatic  writer  of  the  second  class. 
At  the  moment  when  the  pencil  writes  ideas 
which  it  Is  about  to  express  arise  at  once  in 
her  consciousness  so  that  she  Is  herself  In 
doubt  as  to  whether  she  writes  the  sentence 
volitionally,  or  whether  it  is  written  auto- 
matically entirely  Independent  of  her  will. 
Sometimes  while  writing,  the  ideas  come  so 
rapidly  that  unable  to  express  them  with  suf- 
ficient celerity  with  the  pencil  she  bursts  out 
Into  voluble  speech.  To  test  her  doubt,  she 
is  given  a  pencil  and  told  not  to  write.  Then 
she  finds  herself  without  control  of  her  hand, 
and,  in  fact,  the  pencil  writes  the  more  flu- 
ently the  greater  the  effort  she  makes  to  in- 
hibit It.  In  the  midst  of  a  suitable  sentence  I 
hold  her  hand  and  restrain  the  writing,  and 

85 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ask  her  to  complete  the  sentence  by  word  of 
mouth,  which  of  course  she  could  do  if  it  was 
her  own  intelligence,  that  is  No.  i,  that  was 
doing  the  writing;  but  she  cannot  complete 
the  idea,  showing  that  she  does  not  really 
know  what  the  hand  was  about  to  write. 

Again,  Mrs.  B.  in  hypnosis  is  told  to  write 
automatically  when  awake,  "three  times  six 
are  eighteen;  four  times  five  are  twenty." 
After  being  awakened  she  is  given  something 
to  read  aloud;  while  reading  the  hand  begins 
to  write  as  previously  directed,  but  she  stops 
reading  saying,  that  she  cannot  because  the, 
to  her,  absurd  sums  three  times  six  are  eigh- 
teen, four  times  five  are  twenty,  keep  coming 
into  her  head.  She  cannot  understand  why 
she  should  think  of  such  things. 

Now,  are  we  to  conclude  that  the  mechan- 
ism of  automatic  writing  in  the  second  class 
of  writers  differs  from  that  performed  by 
the  first  class,  and  that  when  the  writer  is 
aware  of  the  automatic  thoughts  the  writing 
is  done  by  psychical  processes,  and  that  when 
he  is  not  aware  of  any  automatic  thoughts  it 
is  done  by  physiological  processes?  In  every 
other  respect,  in  content  of  writing  and  in 
behavior  of  the  automatic  personality  to  the 

86 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

environment,  we  find  the  phenomena  are  the 
same.  It  does  not  seem  to  me  that  such  an 
interpretation  is  justifiable.  As  I  view  this 
question  of  the  subconscious,  far  too  much 
weight  is  given  to  the  point  of  awareness  or 
not  awareness  of  our  conscious  processes.  As 
a  matter  of  fact  we  find  entirely  identical 
phenomena,  that  is  identical  in  every  respect 
but  one — that  of  awareness — in  which  some- 
times we  are  aware  of  these  conscious  phe- 
nomena and  sometimes  not;  but  the  one  es- 
sential and  fundamental  quality  in  them  is 
automaticity  or  independence  of  the  personal 
consciousness.  Doubling  and  independence 
of  the  personal  consciousness  are  therefore 
the  test  of  the  subconscious  rather  than  ware- 
ness. 


87 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


In  the  content  of  automatic  writing  we  find 
evidence  which  it  is  difficult  to  reconcile  with 
a  physiological  interpretation.  This  was 
briefly  touched  upon  before.  When  studied 
we  find  that  the  writing  does  not  consist  of 
words,  phrases  and  paragraphs  which  might 
be  mere  repetitions  or  memories  whether  phy- 
siological or  psychical,  of  previous  experi- 
ences, but  even  consist  of  elaborate  original 
compositions.  Sometimes  in  Mrs.  Verrall's 
writing  they  consisted  of  original  Latin  or 
Greek  compositions.^  Sometimes,  as  in  those 
who  are  inclined  to  a  spiritistic  interpreta- 
tion, of  fanciful  fairy-tale-like  fabrications. 
Sometimes  they  exhibit  mathematical  reason- 
ing shown  by  the  solution  of  arithmetical 
problems.  Sometimes  they  consist  of  in- 
geniously fabricated  explanations  in  answer 
to  questions.  Sometimes  they  indicate  a  per- 
sonal character  with  varying  moods  and  tem- 
peraments. Feeling  and  emotion  whether  of 
anger,  hatred  or  malice,  kindness  or  amia- 
bility are  often  manifested.     If  such  a  docu- 

*Proc.  S.  P.  R.,  Vol.  XX,  p't  liii,  1906. 

88 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ment  were  presented  as  testamentary  evi- 
dence in  the  ordinary  course  of  human  affairs, 
it  would  seem  as  if  the  burden  of  proof 
would  lie  with  him  who  would  insist  upon  in- 
terpreting it  as  without  psychological  mean- 
ing and  as  only  the  expression  of  a  physiolog- 
ical activity  of  the  nervous  system  without 
thought. 


89 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


Suggestions  in  hypnosis  may  result  in  post- 
hypnotic phenomena,  which  are  manifesta- 
tions of  an  intelHgence  which  may  be  of  a 
kind  which  cannot  possibly  be  explained  by 
physiological  habits,  as  it  exhibits  logical  re- 
adjustment of  ideas  of  a  high  order;  for  in- 
stance, complex  arithmetical  calculations. 
The  subject  is  only  aware  of  the  final  result, 
being  entirely  ignorant  of  the  process  by 
which  it  was  arrived  at.  Later  this  process 
can  be  recalled  in  hypnosis  as  conscious  mem- 
ories. To  assume  that  such  a  calculation  can 
be  performed  by  a  brain  process  not  accom- 
panied by  thought  would  seem,  to  require  the 
abandonment  of  the  doctrine  of  the  correla- 
tion of  mind  and  brain.  In  some  instances, 
as  with  automatic  writing,  the  subject  be- 
comes aware  of  the  automatic  conscious  pro- 
cess though  ignorant  of  its  origin.  Are  we  to 
assume  here  again  that  the  processes  giving 
rise  to  the  same  manifestations,  under  the 
same  conditions,  differ  in  kind  according  as 
whether  a  subject  is  aware  of  them  or  not — 
in  the  former  case  being  psychical,  in  the  lat- 
ter physiological? 

90 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


The  great  variety  of  phenomena  occurring 
in  abnormal  conditions  are  often  explained  by 
the  patient  in  hypnosis  as  the  manifestations 
of  ideas  (perceptions,  hallucinations,  memo- 
ries, emotions,  etc.),  which  are  remembered 
as  such,  though  unknown  to  the  personal  con- 
sciousness. [This  evidence  does  not  differ 
in  kind  from  that  derived  from  automatic 
writing  (3).] 


91 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

8 

After  all,  as  I  conceive  the  matter,  the  one 
great  difficulty  in  the  minds  of  those  who  are 
unable  to  accept  the  psychological  interpreta- 
tion of  subconscious  phenomena  lies  in  under- 
standing how  we  can  have  states  of  conscious- 
ness of  which  we  are  unaware.  Conscious- 
ness is  represented  as  a  functioning  unity,  and 
it  is  difficult  to  accept  the  notion  that  all 
states  of  consciousness  are  not  so  synthesized 
as  to  form  part  of  that  great  system  which 
we  dub  self-conscious.  Thus,  consciousness  is 
confused  with  ^^//-consciousness.  This  has 
come  about  because  the  only  immediate  exper- 
ience which  anyone  has  of  conscious  states  is 
with  that  which  belongs  to  his  self,  which 
is  only  another  way  of  saying  with  that  of 
which  he  is  aware.  All  conscious  states,  so 
far  as  we  experience  them,  belong  to,  take 
part  in,  or  help  make  up  a  self, — in  fact,  the 
expression,  "We  experience"  implies  a  self 
that  experiences.  It  is  difficult,  therefore,  to 
conceive  of  a  conscious  state  that  is  not  a  part 
of  a  self-conscious  self.  It  seems  queer  then, 
to  think  of  a  state  of  consciousness,  a  sensa- 
tion, a  perception,  an  idea  floating  off — so  to 

92 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

speak — by  its  lonesome  self  and  not  attached 
to  anything  that  can  be  called  a  self.  It  is 
difficult  to  conceive  of  anything  worthy  of  be- 
ing called  a  sensation  or  perception,  excepting 
so  far  as  there  is  a  self  to  experience  it;  and 
yet  it  really  is  a  naive  conception  to  imagine 
that  we  are  self-conscious  of  each  and  every 
conscious  state  that  is  aroused  in  correlation 
with  out  nervous  system.  Such  a  conception 
is  very  much  akin  to  the  naive  notion  of  scien- 
tific materialism  which  assumes,  for  the  prac- 
tical purposes  of  experimentation  or  other 
reasons,  that  phenomenal  matter  really  exists 
as  such.  Consciousness  whether  in  an  ele- 
mentary or  complex  form  must  be  correlated 
with  an  innumerable  number  of  different  phy- 
siological brain  syntheses.  If  this  is  not  so 
the  whole  structure  of  the  psycho-physiology 
of  the  mind  and  brain  falls.  We  have  every 
reason  to  assume  that  some  sort  of  a  psychi- 
cal state  occurs  when  any  one  of  these  asso- 
ciation-groups is  excited  to  activity.  (At  any 
given  moment  the  great  mass  of  them  is  in- 
hibited.) There  is  strong  reason  to  believe 
that  though  ordinarily  there  is  a  harmony  in 
the  functioning  of  these  association-groups, 
yet  at  times  there  is  considerable  disharmony 

93 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

and  there  is  clinical  evidence  for  believing 
that  there  may  be  some  independence  of  ac- 
tivity, especially  under  pathological  condi- 
tions (hallucinations,  obsessions,  etc.),  of 
different  brain  syntheses. 

Without  being  obliged  to  determine  what 
brain  synthesis  belongs  to  the  personal  con- 
sciousness at  any  given  moment,  we  are  enti- 
tled to  ask  why  must  we  necessarily  be  aware 
of  all  the  conscious  states  which  may  belong 
to  each  and  every  brain  association-group?  Is 
this  not  a  naive  assumption?  If  it  is  true  that 
dissociated  brain  systems  can  functionate  (as 
in  other  parts  of  the  nervous  system),  and 
if  it  is  true  that  they  have  psychical  equiva- 
lents, then  whether  we  are  self-conscious  of 
any  given  state  of  consciousness  must  depend, 
it  would  seem,  upon  whether  the  brain  pro- 
cess, correlated  with  it,  is  synthesized  in  a 
particular  way  with  the  larger  system  of 
brain  processes  which  is  correlated  at  a  given 
moment  with  the  self-conscious  personality. 
And  in  so  far  as  a  brain  process  can  occur  de- 
tached from  the  main  system  of  brain  pro- 
cesses, so  far  can  consciousness  occur  without 
self-consciousness.  Unfortunately,  we  have 
scarcely  a  glimmer  of  knowledge  of  the  na- 

94 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ture  of  the  synthesis,  and  therefore  of  the 
conditions  which  determine  whether  we  shall 
be  aware  of  any  conscious  state  or  not.  This 
is  a  problem  in  psychology  which  awaits  the 
future.  Nor  is  self-consciousness  a  neces- 
sary element  of  consciousness.  The  naive 
character  of  the  notion  that  we  must  be  self- 
conscious  of  our  consciousness  is  shown  by 
introspective  analysis  in  intense  mental  con- 
centration or  absent-mindedness.  Here  is  no 
awareness  of  self,  only  a  succession  of  ideas 
which  adjust  and  readjust  themselves.  It  is 
not  until  afterwards,  on  "returning  to  one's 
self,"  that  these  ideas  through  memory  be- 
come a  part  of  our  self-conscious  personality. 
It  will  be  noticed  that  an  essential  element 
in  the  conception  of  the  subconscious,  as  gen- 
erally held  by  students  of  abnormal  phenom- 
ena, is  the  absence  of  awareness  of  the  per- 
sonal consciousness  for  the  dissociated  ideas. 
A  consideration  of  the  facts  in  their  entirety 
do  not  permit  of  so  limited  a  view  to  which  I 
am  compelled  to  dissent.  Theoretically,  a 
conception  so  narrow  prevents  our  obtaining 
a  broad  view  of  allied  psychological  phe- 
nomena, obscures  our  perception  of  the 
broad  principles  underlying  them  and  hinders 

95 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

a  correlation  of  closely  related  conditions. 
Dissociation,  with  activity,  independent  of 
the  main  focus  of  consciousness,  does  not 
necessarily  imply  or  require  absence  of 
awareness  on  the  part  of  the  latter,  and  prac- 
tically, as  we  have  seen  in  discussing  the  phe- 
nomena of  automatic  writing,  under  the  same 
conditions,  a  subject  is  sometimes  aware  of 
the  dissociated  ideas  which  are  actively  mani- 
festing themselves  and  sometimes  not.  The 
same  is  true  of  post-hypnotic  and  abnormal 
phenomena.  Indeed,  even  when  there  is  ab- 
sence of  awareness  on  the  part  of  the  person- 
al consciousness,  the  dissociated  co-conscious- 
ness may,  per  contra,  be  aware  of  the  content 
of  the  former.  For  this  reason,  if  for  no 
other,  co-consciousness  is  the  preferable  term. 
The  one  fundamental  principle  and  criterion 
of  the  subconscious  is  dissociation  and  co-ac- 
tivity (automatism).  When  we  get  rid  of 
this  notion  of  awareness  as  an  essential  ele- 
ment, we  are  able  to  grasp  the  relation  be- 
tween the  subconsciousness  of  hysterics  and 
the  disaggregation  of  personality  of  the  psy- 
chasthenic, a  study  with  which  Dr.  Janet  says 
he  is  now  occupied.  The  obsessions,  the  im- 
pulsions, the  fears,  in  short,  the  imperative 

96 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

Ideas  of  the  psychasthenic  are  as  much  dis- 
aggregated from  the  personal  consciousness 
as  the  same  are  in  the  hysteric,  excepting  for 
that  amount  of  synthesis  that  gives  aware- 
ness. Indeed,  the  hysteric  may  have  a  cer- 
tain amount  of  awareness,  or  awareness  for 
some  and  not  for  other  ideas.  The  only  dif- 
ference then  between  an  ordinary  obsession 
and  a  "subconscious"  obsession  as  commonly 
viewed,  is  that  the  subject  is  aware  of  the 
one  and  not  of  the  other.  Undoubtedly  the 
condition  of  awareness  alters  considerably 
the  resulting  psychical  content,  as  it  brings  in- 
to play  various  co-operative  and  modifying 
and  in  some  measure  adjusting  ideas.  This 
is  not  the  place  to  enter  into  a  consideration 
of  the  differences  and  likenesses  between  psy- 
chasthenia  and  hysteria,  but  I  believe  it  im- 
portant to  insist  that  lack  of  awareness  is  not 
an  essential  fact  or  in  the  development  of  the 
subconscious,  and  furthermore  that  an  ap- 
preciation of  this  fact  will  enable  us  to  better 
correlate  the  different  varieties  of  co-con- 
scious activities  not  only  in  various  diseased 
conditions  but  with  facts  of  normal  mental 
life. 


97 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 


Those  who  maintain  the  physiological  in- 
terpretation seem  to  me  to  involve  thmselves 
in  difficulties  far  greater  than  any  offered  by 
the  psychological  interpretation.  It  is  a 
fundamental  interpretation  of  psycho-physi- 
ology that  all  thought  is  correlated  with  phy- 
siological activities.  Whatever  doctrine  we 
adopt,  whether  that  of  parallelism  or  psycho- 
physical identification,  every  psychical  pro- 
cess is  correlated  with  a  physiological  pro- 
cess and  vice  versa.  We  cannot  conceive  of 
a  psychical  activity  without  a  corresponding 
physiological  one.  How  then  can  we  con- 
ceive of  a  physiological  process  of  a  complex- 
ity and  character  capable  of  exhibiting  itself 
as  a  spontaneous  volitional  intelligence  with- 
out corresponding  correlated  ideas?  Surely 
this  needs  explanation  quite  as  much  as  does 
a  lack  of  awareness  of  conscious  processes. 
Yet  with  a  certain  modification  of  our  con- 
ception of  the  meaning  of  the  physical,  it  is 
possible  to  reconcile  both  interpretations.  As 
a  panpsychist  I  find  no  difficulty  in  accepting 
both  a  physiological  and  a  psychical  interpre- 
tation.    For  those  who  accept  panpsychism 

98 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

there  is  no  distinction  to  be  made  between 
conscious  processes  and  brain  processes  of  a 
certain  order,  excepting  as  a  point  of  view. 
They  become  identified  one  with  the  other. 
The  psychical  is  the  reality  of  the  physical.  I 
cannot  conceive  of  brain  processes  except  as 
objective  phenomena  of  conscious  processes, 
and  I  cannot  conceive  of  consciousness  ex- 
cepting as  the  reality  or  "inner  life"  of  brain 
changes.  So  that  we  may  indifferently  de- 
scribe automatic  actions  as  manifestations  of 
physiological  activities,  if  we  keep  to  one  set 
of  terms,  or  of  psychical  activities  if  we  mix 
the  terms.  But  in  doing  this  let  us  not  strad- 
dle and  deceive  ourselves  as  to  our  real  posi- 
tion. In  thinking  in  physiological  terms  we 
must  not  confuse  ourselves  and,  by  adopting 
a  terminology,  imagine  that  those  physical 
brain  factors  are  without  psychical  equiva- 
lents. To  hold  to  a  pure  physiological  expla- 
nation without  the  notion  of  anything  psychi- 
cal as  a  part  of  their  real  nature,  is  to  postu- 
late consciousness  as  a  pure  epi-phenomenon, 
something  that  we  can  shift  in  and  out  at  our 
pleasure,  when  we  have  brain  action,  and  jug- 
gle with  as  a  conjurer  juggles  with  his  coins, 
— now  you  see  them  and  now  you  don't. 

99 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

It  may  be  that  the  final  explanation  of 
many  conscious  processes,  if  we  would  avoid 
the  entanglements  of  metaphysics,  must  be 
in  physiological  terms,  because  it  must  deal 
with  that  which  belongs  to  experience.  We 
can  experience  physiological  "after  effects," 
and  by  a  simple  inference  go  back  to  the  phy- 
siological functioning  forerunner,  and  thus 
perhaps  explain  memory,  but,  as  Professor 
Miinsterberg  so  well  points  out,  it  is  difficult 
to  see  how  a  comprehensible  explanation  of 
memory  can  be  found  in  "mental  disposi- 
tions," and  on  grounds,  as  I  would  state  them, 
that  such  dispositions  being  out  of  conscious- 
ness we  have  no  experience  of  them  and  can 
have  no  conception  of  what  they  are.  They 
become  nothing  more  than  meta-physical  con- 
cepts. For  myself  I  cannot  even  think  of  a 
"mental  disposition,"  meaning,  for  instance, 
a  name  or  mental  picture  that  is  not  at  the 
moment  a  state  of  consciousness,  whether 
subconscious  or  belonging  to  my  self-con- 
scious synthesis.  However  this  may  be,  I 
not  only  say  with  Professor  Miinsterberg 
that  "the  physiological  cerebration  is  well 
able  to  produce  the  'intellectual'  result,"  but 
it  must  be  able  to  do  so.    The  only  question 

100 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

is  whether  it  is  accompanied  by,  belongs  to, 
or  is  another  aspect  of  ideas.  This  can,  to 
my  way  of  thinking,  only  be  settled  by  logical 
inferences  from  the  observed  phenomena, 
and  I  have  endeavored  in  what  has  gone  be- 
fore to  marshal  the  evidence  so  far  as  it  ex- 
ists today  in  substantiation  of  this  interpre- 
tation. 


lOI 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORMA 
EAJNTA  BARBARA  CULUEGE  LlBRAfil 


CHAPTER  SIX 

The  Conception  of  the  Subconscious 

BY  BERNARD  HART,  M.  B.,  M.  R.  C.  S. 

Assistant  Medical  Officer,  Long  Grove  Asy- 
lum, Epsom 

THE  conception  of  the  subconscious 
has  of  recent  years  acquired  a 
dominating  position  in  psychia- 
try. The  utiHty  of  this  concep- 
tion in  the  co-ordination  of  our 
knowledge,  and  its  fruitfulness  in  suggesting 
new  lines  of  research,  have  become  so  obvi- 
ous, that  the  opposition  which  it  at  first 
aroused  has  been  almost  altogether  over- 
come. Considerable  disagreement,  however, 
still  exists  as  to  the  precise  meaning  to  be 
ascribed  to  the  term.  What  is  the  nature  of 
a  subconscious  process — is  it  a  physical  or 

"No  fact  of  abnormal  experience  can  by  itself  prove 
that  psychological  and  not  a  physiological  explanation 
is  needed ;  it  is  a  philosophical  problem  which  must 
be  settled  by  principle  before  the  explanation  of  the 
special    facts   begins." — Munsterberg. 

1 02  ^-  ' 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

mental  phenomenon?  This  and  other  similar 
questions  constitute  a  fertile  source  of  dis- 
pute, and  the  Symposium  which  recently  ap- 
peared in  this  Journal  showed  the  very  di- 
vergent views  held  by  some  of  the  Leading 
psychologists  and  psychiatrists  of  the  day. 

The  present  paper  is  an  attempt  to  investi- 
gate the  essential  nature  of  this  conception, 
to  determine  its  claims  to  a  place  in  the  struc- 
ture of  modern  science,  and  the  position 
which  must  be  assigned  to  it  within  that  struc- 
ture. 

It  will  be  profitable  to  first  consider  the 
more  important  stages  in  the  historical  devel- 
opment of  the  theory  of  the  subconscious. 
Our  next  step  will  be  an  enquiry  concerning 
the  characters  which  modern  science  demands 
that  a  conception  shall  possess  in  order  to 
qualify  it  for  admission  within  its  portals. 
We  shall  then  be  in  a  position  to  consider 
how  far  the  conception  of  the  subconscious 
satisfies  these  demands,  and  to  determine  its 
place  and  function  in  psychology. 

The  history  of  all  thought  has  been  domi- 
nated throughout  by  an  essential  tendency  of 
the  human  mind — the  endeavor  to  obtain  con- 
tinuity.    The  mind  abhors  discontinuity  as 

103 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

nature  is  said  to  abhor  a  vacuum.  It  strives 
to  bring  every  new  experience  into  line  with 
the  old,  to  do  away  with  inexplicable  gaps, 
and  to  reduce  its  world  to  a  connected  intelli- 
gible whole.  Mythology,  religion,  and  phil- 
osophical systems  provide  us  with  numerous 
examples  of  this  constant  endeavor.  Science 
is  nothing  but  the  same  trend  of  thought  be- 
come coherent  and  articulate. 

Now  it  was  early  seen  in  the  history  of 
philosophy  that,  among  the  contrasts  to  be 
observed  between  the  physical  and  mental, 
one  of  the  most  prominent  was  the  compara- 
tive discontinuity  of  the  latter.  The  psychi- 
cal life  made  its  appearance  in  an  irregular 
manner,  in  flashes  of  limited  duration,  and  in 
the  intervals  between  these  flashes  it  ap- 
peared to  altogether  cease  to  exist.  In  con- 
trast to  this  the  material  world  seemed  rela- 
tively continuous,  permanent,  and  independ- 
ent of  the  individual.  Hence,  if  the  study  of 
the  mind  was  to  be  brought  into  line  with  the 
rest  of  our  knowledge,  an  attempt  had  to  be 
made  to  get  rid  of  the  apparent  discontinuity 
and  irregularity  of  psychical  experience.  Such 
an  attempt  has  formed  an  integral  part  of 
most    philosophical    systems.     The    method 

104 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

adopted  by  the  earlier  philosophers,  how- 
ever, consisted  mostly  in  imaginative  and  fan- 
tastic constructions,  which  aimed  solely  at  in- 
ternal coherence,  and  which  had  but  little  re- 
lation to  the  facts.  It  was  only  after  the 
method  of  the  inductive  sciences  had  long 
demonstrated  its  utility  in  other  branches  of 
knowledge,  that  an  endeavor  was  made  to 
apply  it  to  the  sphere  of  psychology. 

The  first  serious  contribution  to  the  filling 
up  of  the  gaps  in  the  psychical  series  was 
made  by  Leibnitz,  who  demonstrated  that 
our  conscious  life  contains  small  elements  ly- 
ing outside  its  main  stream,  but  which  never- 
theless produce  an  effect  by  a  process  of  sum- 
mation and  combination.  Schopenhauer  (i) 
thought  that  a  large  number  of  our  sense  per- 
ceptions were  the  result  of  unconscious  pro- 
cesses of  reasoning — and  the  same  theory 
was  propounded  in  a  more  exact  form  by 
Helmholtz  (2).  By  this  period,  therefore, 
the  attempt  to  bridge  the  intervals  in  the  psy- 
chical series  by  processes  of  unconscious 
thought  had  taken  definite  shape. 

The  question  of  the  subconscious  first,  how- 
ever, became  prominent  with  the  publication 
of  Hartmann's  *'Philosophie  des  Unbewus- 

105 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

sten,"  in  1868.  The  intense  enthusiasm  with 
which  this  work  was  greeted  in  the  most  var- 
ied quarters  affords  a  striking  demonstration 
of  that  hunger  for  continuity  whose  existence 
we  have  already  noted.  Hartmann  con- 
ceived the  subconscious  as  a  second  personal- 
ity concealed  beneath  the  surface  of  our  or- 
dinary consciousness,  but  precisely  compara- 
ble to  the  latter  in  its  structure  and  functions. 
He  appeals  to  this  hypothetical  being  when- 
ever there  is  a  gap  in  the  chain  of  visible 
causation,  and  endows  it  with  properties  of  a 
really  startling  kind.  "Let  us  not  despair," 
he  says,  "at  having  a  mind  so  practical  and 
so  lowly,  so  unpoetical  and  so  little  spiritual; 
there  is  within  the  innermost  sanctuary  of 
each  of  us  a  marvellous  something  of  which 
we  are  unconscious,  which  dreams  and  prays 
while  we  labor  to  earn  our  daily  bread"  (3) . 
Hartmann's  work  is  of  historical  importance 
on  account  of  the  stimulus  it  provided  to 
further  investigation,  but  his  use  of  the  con- 
cept of  the  unconscious  was  so  unbridled  that 
the  value  of  his  actual  results  is  almost  alto- 
gether nullified.  James  has  described  his 
theory  as  a  "tumbling  ground  for  whimsies," 
and  Hoffding  remarks,  "We  may  say  of  it, 

106 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

as  Galileo  said  of  the  appeal  to  an  almighty 
will,  it  explains  nothing  because  it  explains 
everything"  (4). 

Some  of  the  most  important  advances  in 
the  historical  development  of  the  subcon- 
scious have  been  furnished  by  the  French 
School  of  Morbid  Psychology  during  the  lat- 
ter part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  initiated 
under  Charcot  and  Ribot,  and  culminating  in 
the  work  of  Janet.  In  his  classical  "Automa- 
tisme  Psychologique"  the  latter  demon- 
strated that  a  large  number  of  morbid  phe- 
nomena can  be  adequately  explained  by  as- 
suming the  existence  of  dissociated  mental 
elements  altogether  outside  the  sphere  of  the 
personality. 

Morton  Prince  has  further  developed  Ja- 
net's point  of  view.  He  divides  psychologi- 
cal material  into  that  of  wh>ch  the  individual 
is  personally  conscious,  and  that  of  which  he 
is  not  personally  conscious.  Those  experi- 
ences are  personally  conscious  which  are  syn- 
thesized in  the  "personality."  The  experi- 
ences of  which  the  individual  is  not  personal- 
ly conscious  are  further  divided  into  co-con- 
scious and  unconscious.  Co-conscious  corre- 
sponds in  the  main  to  Janet's  "subconscious" 

107 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

— actively  functioning  ideas  dissociated  from 
the  personality.  Under  unconscious  are  in- 
cluded the  phenomena  of  memory,  and  in 
general  all  the  ideas,  traces,  etc.,  which  are 
not  at  the  moment  actively  functioning,  and 
which  are  to  be  regarded  as  mere  physiologi- 
cal residua.  Any  of  these  latter  may  at  any 
time  become  conscious  or  co-conscious.  Dr. 
Prince  considers  that  the  essential  character 
of  a  co-conscious  idea  consists  in  the  fact  that 
it  leads  an  autonomous  existence,  and  is  not 
dependent  upon  the  ego-complex.  Co-con- 
scious, therefore,  does  not  necessarily  imply 
that  the  ego  is  unaware  of  the  idea  In  ques- 
toin.  Thus,  in  the  well-known  case  described 
in  "The  Dissociation  of  a  Personality,"  one 
personality  knows  all  the  thoughts  and  ac- 
tions of  a  second,  but  considers  them  to  be 
those  of  another  being  whom,  indeed,  she  re- 
gards with  unconcealed  dislike.  This  exten- 
sion of  the  meaning  of  Janet's  conception  is 
very  important,  and  enables  us  to  throw  more 
light  upon  the  analogous  manifestations  oc- 
curring in  paranoia. 

The  most  modern  development  of  the  doc- 
trine of  the  subconscious  is  to  be  found  In  the 
works  of  Freud,  Jung,  and  the  Zurich  School. 

io8 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

Their  conception  is  totally  different  from 
those  enumerated  above,  far  more  different 
than  is  generally  supposed.  This  point  will 
be  better  appreciated  after  a  consideration  of 
certain  philosophical  questions,  which  will 
subsequently  be  discussed. 

We  have  seen  that  the  concept  of  the  sub- 
conscious mind  has  gradually  developed  as  a 
result  of  the  demand  for  continuity  in  the  psy- 
chical series.  This  same  demand  for  con- 
tinuity has,  however,  led  to  an  endeavor  to 
solve  the  difficulty  in  an  altogether  different 
manner.  Certain  philosophers  asserted  that 
the  psychical  was  unreal,  a  mere  epiphenom- 
enal  product  of  the  physical,  and  that  nothing 
but  the  material  existed.  The  brain  was  con- 
sidered to  secrete  thought  as  the  liver  se- 
cretes bile.  This  school  reached  its  zenith  in 
the  materialism  of  Moleschott  and  Biichner 
— a  crude  and  naive  philosophy  now  general- 
ly discredited.  Later  authorities,  however, 
while  admitting  the  reality  of  the  psychical, 
denied  that  it  could  be  made  amenable  to  the 
method  of  science.  Thus  Karl  Lange  re- 
quired that  all  psychological  definitions 
should  be  replaced  by  physiological,  and 
Mijnsterberg  asserted  that  "mental  facts,  as 

109 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

they  are  not  quantitative,  cannot  enter  into 
any  causal  relation"  (5).  It  will  be  seen, 
therefore,  that  these  authorities  consider  that 
so  long  as  we  are  dealing  with  psychical  facts 
there  can  be  no  question  of  causation  or  of 
science.  They  must  be  first  translated  into 
physiological  terms,  and  it  will  then  be  pos- 
sible to  formulate  laws  concerning  them,  and 
thus  to  incorporate  them  into  the  structure  of 
our  knowledge.  This  school  has  been  aptly 
described  by  Hoffding  as  virtually  wishing  to 
abolish  psychology  in  order  to  convert  it  in- 
to a  science.  For  the  exponents  of  this  theo- 
ry the  question  of  the  subconscious  does  not 
exist — consciousness  and  subconsciousness 
are  alike  to  be  reduced  to  physiological  terms, 
and  the  difference  between  them  consists 
merely  in  a  varying  mode  of  combination  of 
the  cerebral  elements. 

Certain  other  authorities  adopt  a  compro- 
mise— they  are  ready  to  consider  conscious- 
ness psychologically,  but  the  subconscious  is 
for  them  nothing  but  an  inappropriate  name 
for  brain  processes  which  have  no  psycholog- 
ical accompaniment. 

The  main  question  at  issue  between  these 
various  schools  is,    therefore,  whether    the 

IIO 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

subconscious  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  brain  fact 
or  as  a  mind  fact,  whether  it  is  a  subject  for 
physiology  or  for  psychology.  The  present 
paper  endeavors  to  show  that  this  question  is 
in  itself  based  upon  a  misconception  and  that 
its  solution  becomes  at  once  obvious  when  the 
meaning  of  the  terms  is  correctly  apprehend- 
ed. 

As  a  preliminary  measure  it  will  be  neces- 
sary to  temporarily  diverge  from  our  main 
subject,  and  to  shortly  consider  the  general 
properties  of  scientific  concepts. 

The  philosophical  consideration  of  the 
groundwork  of  science  is  a  growth  of  com- 
paratively recent  years.  The  earlier  scien- 
tists contented  themselves  with  practical  re- 
sults, and  did  not  consider  the  foundations 
upon  which  they  were  building.  During  the 
latter  part  of  the  nineteenth  century,  how- 
ever, the  need  for  a  precise  formulation  and 
definition  of  these  foundations  began  to  make 
itself  felt.  Hence  there  arose  a  school  of 
critical  philosophy  unique  amongst  philoso- 
phical creeds  in  the  fact  that  its  exponents 
have  been  men  eminent  in  the  scientific  world 
^Clark-Maxwell,  Ostwald,  Mach,  Karl 
Pearson.     Pearson's  "Grammar  of  Science" 

III 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

remains  the  finest  vindication  in  the  English 
language  of  the  principles,  aims,  and  methods 
of  modern  science.  The  short  exposition 
which  follows  is  an  endeavor  to  cull  the  es- 
sential points  from  its  pages.  But  hmitations 
of  space  prevent  more  than  a  short  summary 
of  the  principal  conclusions  being  given,  and 
for  the  demonstration  of  their  validity  the 
reader  must  be  referred  to  the  original  work. 
Science  is  characterized,  not  by  its  content 
but  by  its  method  of  investigation — it  em- 
braces the  whole  field  of  knowledge  and  is  as 
applicable  to  history  as  it  is  to  chemistry.  It 
deals,  not  with  a  fabulous  entity  called  "mat- 
ter," but  with  the  content  of  the  human  mind, 
and  acknowledges  its  incapacity  to  deal  with 
anything  which  forms  no  part  of  that  con- 
tent. The  material  of  science  is  therefore 
human  experience,  what  James  calls  "the  flux 
of  sensible  reality."  In  other  words,  phe- 
nomena, of  whatever  sort  or  kind  they  may 
happen  to  be,  constitute  the  material,  while 
science  is  simply  our  method  of  treating  this 
material.  Now  it  is  found  that  human  ex- 
perience does  not  take  place  in  an  entirely 
haphazard  and  chaotic  manner,  but  that  the 
events  follow  one  another  with  more  or  less 

112 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

regularity  and  order.  This  is  the  principle 
of  the  uniformity  of  nature.  The  aim  of 
science  is  to  find  a  means  of  proceeding  from 
one  point  of  experience  to  another  with  the 
least  exertion  of  mental  energy,  in  other 
words  to  achieve  an  "economy  of  thought." 
Its  method  is,  firstly,  to  take  some  portion  of 
human  experience  and  to  classify  the  facts 
found  therein  into  sequences;  secondly,  to 
find  some  simple  treatment  which  will  re- 
sume an  indefinite  number  of  sequences  in  a 
single  formula.  Such  a  formula  constitutes  a 
scientific  law.  The  law  is  the  more  funda- 
mental the  wider  the  range  of  facts  which  it 
resumes.  It  is  not  a  mythological  entity,  it 
is  merely  a  construction  of  the  human  mind 
to  enable  it  to  deal  better  with  its  experience. 
If  we  examine  any  scientific  law  in  order  to 
determine  its  essential  nature,  we  find  that  it 
has  no  immediate  reference  to  sense  impres- 
sions, or,  in  other  words,  to  phenomenal 
reality,  but  is  purely  ideational  or  conceptual 
in  character.  The  meaning  of  this  statement 
will  be  made  clearer  by  taking  an  example,  e. 
g.,  Newton's  law  that  "every  particle  attracts 
every  other  particle."  Now  a  particle  is  not 
a  sense-impression;  it  is  defined  as  an  infinite- 

"3 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ly  small  portion  of  matter,  that  is  to  say,  a 
pure  idea,  formed  by  carrying  what  is  given 
in  sense  impressions  to  a  conceptual  limit  in 
the  mind.  "Newton  is  here  dealing  with  con- 
ceptual notions,  for  he  never  saw,  nor  has 
any  physicist  since  his  time  ever  seen,  individ- 
ual particles,  or  been  able  to  examine  how  the 
motion  of  two  such  particles  is  related  to 
their  position"  (6).  Similarly  geometry, 
with  its  points,  straight  lines,  and  surfaces,  is 
dealing  with  entities  which  are  frankly  ac- 
knowledged to  be  conceptual  in  character, 
and  to  have  no  real  existence  in  the  world  of 
sense  impressions.  The  physical  conceptions 
of  the  atom  and  the  ether  are  precisely  anal- 
ogous in  their  nature.  We  find,  therefore, 
that  science  does  not  profess  to  mirror  some 
hypothetical  universe  lying  altogether  outside 
the  human  mind,  but  simply  to  provide  a  con- 
ceptual model,  a  "conceptual  shorthand,"  by 
aid  of  which  we  can  resume  our  sense  im- 
pressions and  predict  future  occurrences. 
"The  physicist  forms  a  conceptual  model  of 
the  universe  by  aid  of  corpuscles.  These 
corpuscles  are  only  symbols  for  the  compo- 
nent parts  of  perceptual  bodies,  and  are  not 
to  be  considered  as  resembling  definite  per- 

114 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ceptual  equivalents.  We  conceive  them  to 
move  in  the  manner  which  enables  us  most 
accurately  to  describe  the  sequences  of  our 
sense  impressions.  This  manner  of  motion 
is  summed  up  in  the  so-called  law  of  motion" 
(7).  We  therefore  reach  the  conclusion  that 
science  is  simply  a  mode  of  conceiving  things. 
The  justification  of  science  lies  precisely  in 
the  fact  that  it  does  enable  us  to  resume  our 
sense  impressions  and  predict  future  occur- 
rences; its  value  as  truth  lies  in  its  value  as  a 
working  hypothesis  by  which  we  may  be- 
come the  masters  of  phenomena. 

Now  there  may  be  more  than  one  mode  of 
conceiving  the  same  things,  and  which  mode 
we  adopt  may  depend  on  the  practical  neces- 
sities of  the  moment.  Thus  the  mathemati- 
cian insists  on  regarding  bodies  as  bounded 
by  continuous  surfaces,  whereas  the  physicist 
is  compelled  to  regard  them  as  bounded  by 
discontinuous  atoms.  Neither  of  these  modes 
is  more  true  than  the  other;  the  question  is 
merely  which  one  has  the  greatest  practical 
value  in  the  particular  sphere  of  thought  in 
question. 

Armed  with  these  conceptions  let  us  now 
direct  our  attention  to    those    fields    which 

"5 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

more  particularly  concern  us,  and  firstly  let 
us  consider  the  problem  of  the  physical  and 
the  mental.  What,  in  fact,  is  the  difference 
between  physics  and  psychology?  We  are  us- 
ually told  that  there  are  two  orders  of  phe- 
nomena, the  physical  and  the  mental,  two 
series  which  are  so  qualitatively  different  that 
the  passage  from  one  to  the  other  is  unthink- 
able. Concerning  the  relation  between  these 
two  series  innumerable  philosophical  battles 
have  been  waged,  and  science  must  approach 
the  question  with  a  due  regard  for  the  meta- 
physical quicksands  which  await  her  on  every 
side.  It  was  pointed  out  by  Bishop  Berkeley 
that  sense  impressions  are  the  only  things  of 
which  we  have  any  immediate  knowledge, 
and  modern  science,  having  with  some  diffi- 
culty duly  digested  this  fact,  has  discarded 
the  pretence  that  it  is  engaged  In  a  research 
into  "things  in  themselves,"  and  has  relegat- 
ed the  latter  to  the  limbo  of  useless  figments. 
Being  entirely  pragmatic  in  its  ideals,  and 
having  a  criterion  of  validity  measured  solely 
by  utility,  it  recognizes  that  its  field  is  the 
content  of  the  human  mind,  neither  more  nor 
less.  The  modern  scientist  cannot  therefore 
be  accused  of  sharing  the  vulgar  conception 

ii6 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

that  "reality"  consists  of  "material  sub- 
stance," which  by  means  of  "energy  and 
force"  acts  on  "spiritual  substance,"  giving 
rise  in  the  latter  to  "sensations"  which  mir- 
ror the  external  reality.  What,  then,  does 
he  mean  when  he  distinguishes  between  the 
mental  and  the  material?  The  answer  is  that 
he  means  two  different  modes  of  conceiving 
human  experience.  On  the  phenomenal  plane 
the  physicist  and  the  psychologist  are  dealing 
with  precisely  the  same  entities,  sense  impres- 
sions; the  distinction  between  them  lies  in 
their  different  conceptual  methods  of  resum- 
ing these  sense  impressions  so  as  to  express 
them  in  simple  formulae.  The  physicist  re- 
sumes his  sense  impressions  by  means  of  a 
conceptual  model  involving  space  and  time, 
whereas  the  psychologist  regards  them  as  act- 
ual or  potential  constituents  of  a  conscious- 
ness. As  Mach  (8)  puts  it,  there  is  a  "change 
of  direction"  in  their  methods  of  research. 
The  ultimate  goal  of  the  physicist  is  a  com- 
plete description  of  the  universe  in  terms  of 
motion  or  mechanism,  the  ultimate  goal  of 
the  psychologist  is  "personality."  Neither 
method  is  in  itself  better,  more  perfect,  or 
more  real  than  the  other,  both  have  an  equal 

117 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

right  to  be  incorporated  into  the  structure  of 
science,  comparison  between  them  can  only 
be  made  on  the  grounds  of  utility.  We  are 
only  entitled  to  ask  by  which  method  we  are 
better  enabled  to  resume  our  experience  of 
the  past  and  to  predict  our  experience  of  the 
future.  And  the  only  answer  to  this  question 
which  it  is  possible  to  give  in  the  present 
state  of  knowledge  is  that  both  methods  are 
of  value,  and  that  neither  can  be  abandoned 
in  favor  of  the  other. 

For  the  present  the  physiologist  and  the 
psychologist  must  be  allowed  to  proceed 
along  their  respective  roads.  But  there  must 
be  no  jumping  from  one  mode  of  conception 
to  the  other.  The  physiologist  must  not  in- 
troduce a  psychological  conception  into  his 
chain  of  cause  and  effect,  nor  must  the  psy- 
chologist fill  up  the  gaps  in  his  reasoning  with 
cells  and  nerve  currents.  The  former  error 
is  comparatively  rarely  met  with,  the  latter 
is  unfortunately  only  too  common.  No  phy- 
siologist would  consent  to  admit  "ideas"  as 
active  elements  in  the  sequence  of  changes 
which  take  place  in  the  nervous  system.  He 
simply  points  out  that  he  has  no  use  for  such 
a  conception,  and  that,  so  far  from  helping 

ii8 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

him  in  his  explanation  of  phenomena,  it  viti- 
ates his  reasoning,  and  destroys  the  validity 
of  all  his  former  concepts.  The  psychologist, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  a  weaker  vessel;  he  less 
commonly  belongs  to  what  James  has  termed 
the  "tough-minded"  school  of  philosophy. 
He  is  usually  prepared  to  humbly  admit  that 
the  phenomena  of  memory  are  adequately  ex- 
plained by  the  potential  physical  energy  of  a 
brain  cell,  and  does  not  venture  to  suggest 
that  the  potential  psychical  energy  of  an  idea 
is  a  conception  just  as  valid,  and  with  pre- 
cisely the  same  claim  or  lack  of  claim  to  real 
existence.* 

The  distinction  between  the  phenomenal 
and  conceptual  which  underlies  the  principles 

*This  exposition  of  the  method  of  science  is  mainly 
extracted  from  a  paper  by  the  author,  entitled  "A 
Philosophy  of  Psychiatry"  (Journal  of  Mental  Science, 
July,  1908),  which  contains  a  more  detailed  investiga- 
tion of  the  scientific  basis  of  Psychiatry.  The  term 
"sense-impression"  has  been  used  for  the  sake  of  sim- 
plicity. It  can  no  longer  be  maintained,  however,  that 
the  mind  contains  nothing  but  sensory  elements. 
Thought  and  emotion  involve  factors  which  cannot 
be  reduced  to  terms  of  sensation,  in  the  proper  mean- 
ing of  that  word.  To  be  strictly  accurate,  "element  of 
experience"  should  be  substituted  for  "sense-impres- 
sion" in  the  above  description. 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

given  above,  is  of  fundamental  importance. 
Anything  which  can  be  experienced  is  a  phe- 
nomenal fact — a  scientific  concept  is  a  con- 
struction of  the  mind  which  cannot  be  exper- 
ienced at  all.  A  nerve  fibre  is  a  phenomenal 
fact,  the  nerve  current  which  traverses  it  is  a 
conception.  The  nerve  current  is  not  a  por- 
tion of  our  experience,  we  only  experience 
the  results  which  we  ascribe  to  it;  in  other 
words,  we  invent  the  nerve  current  to  explain 
the  phenomenal  result.  Similarly  colors, 
chemical  substances,  falling  bodies  are  phe- 
nomena; ether  waves,  atoms,  the  force  of 
gravity  are  conceptions.  Precisely  the  same 
distinction  is  met  with  in  the  scientific  treat- 
ment of  the  psychological  series,  a  fact  which 
we  shall  hope  to  subsequently  demonstrate. 

It  is  only  within  recent  years  that  morbid 
psychology  has  become  amenable  to  the 
method  of  science.  It  was  necessary  that  ob- 
jectives should  replace  introspective  psychol- 
ogy, and  that  the  presence  of  certain  external 
signs  should  be  regarded  as  indicating  the 
presence  of  certain  conscious  processes,  a  de- 
duction from  analogy  which  every  man 
makes  when  he  talks  to  any  other  man.  With- 
out this  assumption  any  scientific  treatment 

120 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

of  the  mental  processes  of  the  insane  was  ob- 
viously impossible.  It  is  needless  to  point 
out  that  psychology  must  also  posulate  the 
existence  of  an  absolute  determinism  within 
the  psychical  series.  The  law  of  causation 
forms  the  essential  basis  of  the  method  of 
science. 

Our  conception  of  the  nature  of  science, 
and  its  relation  to  psychology,  may  therefore 
be  summarized  as  follows: 

( 1 )  The  psychical  and  the  physical  are 
two  different  modes  of  conceiving  human  ex- 
perience. 

(2)  From  the  point  of  view  of  science  we 
are  compelled  to  postulate  an  absolute  de- 
terminism within  each  of  these  modes. 

(3)  The  method  of  science  is  applicable 
to  either  mode.  It  consists  in  the  more  or 
less  arbitrary  division  of  phenomenal  exper- 
ience Into  artificial  elements,  and  the  construc- 
tion of  laws  regulating  the  interaction  of 
these  elements.  The  sole  justification  of 
these  laws  consists  in  the  fact  that  they  en- 
able us  to  resume  and  predict  our  experience, 
and  hence  to  achieve  an  "economy  of 
thought." 

(4)  Science  does  not  claim  that  the  ele- 

121 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ments  with  which  it  deals  necessarily  have 
perceptual  equivalents,  and  it  may  ascribe 
properties  to  certain  of  these  elements  which 
are  even  contradictory  to  all  perceptual  ex- 
perience, e.  g.,  a  weightless  and  frictionless 
ether.  The  constructions  of  science  are 
therefore  largely  conceptual  in  character, 
and  must  be  sharply  distinguished  from  the 
phenomena  which  constitute  our  actual  ex- 
perience. 

(5)  The  various  elements  entering  into  a 
conceptual  construction  must  all  be  of  the 
same  mode,  they  may  be  either  physical  or 
psychical,  but  cannot  consist  in  a  mixture  of 
the  two. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  return  to  our 
main  theme,  and  to  consider  in  the  light  of 
first  principles  the  various  doctrines  of  the 
subconscious  so  far  enunciated. 

It  is  at  once  obvious  that  we  must  funda- 
mentally disagree  with  those  authorities  who 
regard  the  subconscious  as  a  brain  fact  and 
not  as  a  mind  fact.  Such  a  view  involves  that 
jumping  from  one  mode  of  conception  to 
the  other,  from  the  psychological  to  the  phy- 
siological which  we  have  seen  to  be  incom- 
patible with  the  method  of  science.     A  con- 

122 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ception  must  be  in  the  same  terms  as  the 
phenomena  which  it  is  designed  to  connect. 
We  cannot  conceive  cells  and  fibres  as  the 
connection  between  two  ideas.  The  concep- 
tions of  psychology  must  all  be  constructed 
within  the  psychical  series.  Only  in  this  way 
can  psychology  have  the  same  air  as  its  sister 
sciences,  the  construction  of  a  conceptual 
model  which  will  enable  us  to  resume  our 
past  and  to  predict  our  future  experience. 
The  conception  of  the  subconscious  has  been 
devised  by  the  psychologist  to  explain  certain 
psychological  phenomena — it  must  be  re- 
garded as  a  psychological  conception. 

For  the  same  reasons  memory  must  also  be 
regarded  as  a  psychological  conception,  a 
conception  constructed  to  fill  up  the  gaps  In 
the  phenomenal  psychic  series.  It  Is,  of 
course,  true  that  memory  Is  not  Itself  a  phe- 
nomenal psychic  fact,  we  only  experience  the 
recurrence  of  a  certain  mental  process — we 
assume,  in  order  to  satisfy  our  demand  for 
continuity,  that  it  has  in  some  way  existed 
during  the  Interval,  and  we  Invent  the  con- 
ception of  memory  to  explain  this  continued 
existence.  To  the  reader  who  has  not  ade- 
quately grasped  the   essential  principles  of 

123 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

the  modern  philosophy  of  science  this  may 
appear  to  be  a  very  unsatisfactory  explana- 
tion of  memory.  He  may  object  that  if  this 
is  all  that  psychology  can  say  in  the  matter  he 
would  prefer  to  adopt  the  physiological  point 
of  view,  and  to  regard  memory  as  the  con- 
servation of  traces  in  the  brain.  But  he  will 
find  that  the  physiological  conception  of 
memory  is  no  more  a  phenomenal  fact  than 
the  psychological.  He  will  find  himself  us- 
ing such  terms  as  "nervous  energy,"  "per- 
meability of  paths,"  and  other  purely  concep- 
tual ideas,  and  he  will  finally  begin  to  realize 
that  his  "conserved  trace"  is  merely  a  con- 
ception invented  to  resume  the  fact  that  a 
certain  brain  phenomenon  is  capable  of  re- 
peating itself.  Translating  memory  into  the 
physical  series  does  not  make  it  a  phenome- 
nal fact,  it  must  inevitably  remain  a  concep- 
tion. And  if  memory  from  both  points  of 
view  is  merely  a  conception,  then  surely  if 
we  are  talking  of  the  recurrence  of  mental 
phenomena  it  is  a  psychological  conception. 
Both  in  this  case  and  in  that  of  the  subcon- 
scious no  useful  purpose  is  served  by  sud- 
denly jumping  into  the  other  series,  and  all 
hope  of  discovering  a  comprehensive  scien- 

124 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

tific  law  is  ipso  facto  abolished.  To  maintain 
that  the  subconscious  Is  a  brain  fact  and  not 
a  mind  fact  is  precisely  analogous  to  main- 
taining that  the  law  of  gravity  is  a  psycholog- 
ical conception  and  not  a  physical  concep- 
tion.* 

*Munsterberg  (see  Chapter  One)  has  objected  that 
"Those  who  insist  that  the  memory  idea  presupposes  a 
lasting  mental  disposition  and  cannot  be  explained  by 
physiological  after-effect,  only  forget  that  the  same 
logic  would  demand  a  special  mental  disposition  also 
for  each  new  perception.  The  whole  mystery  of  an 
idea  entering  into  consciousness  presents  itself  per- 
fectly every  time  when  we  use  ous  eyes  or  ears."  We 
cannot  admit  that  this  is  altogether  true — the  logical 
extension  of  the  doctrines  enunciated  above  would  be 
simply  that  every  new  sensation  might  be  also  due  to 
a  previous  "mental  disposition."  But  science  demands 
of  its  conceptions  that  they  should  satisfy  the  criterion 
of  utility.  We  construct  a  conceptual  memory  and 
a  conceptual  subconscious  in  order  to  explain  our  ex- 
perience— the  conception  of  a  previous  mental  dispo- 
sition for  each  new  sensation  would  serve  no  useful 
purpose  whatever.  We  have  to  admit  that  sensations 
appear  in  a  mind  without  any  antecedents  in  that  mind, 
and  there  can  be  no  scientific  objection  to  such  an  ad- 
mission. Such  an  objection  could  only  have  force  if 
we  postulated  a  law  of  conservation  of  psychic  energy 
for  each  individual  consciousness  analogous  to  that 
holding  in  the  material  world.  If  we  adopt  panpsychism 
we  may  assert  the  existence  of  psychic  antecedents  to 
every  sensation,  but  these  would  not,  of  course,  exist 

125 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

The  example  of  memory  shows  us  that 
psychology,  like  its  sister  sciences,  has  its 
phenomena  and  conceptions.  This  is  only  a 
reiteration  of  the  fact  that  sciences  do  not 
differ  in  their  method,  but  only  in  their  ma- 
terial. For  the  sake  of  simplicity  we  have 
so  far  spoken  of  the  subconscious  as  if  it 
were  also  conceptual  in  character,  but  this 
position  now  requires  considerable  qualifica- 
tion. 

It  is  of  fundamental  importance  to  recog- 
nize the  fact  that  different  authors  when  they 
speak  of  the  subconscious  not  only  speak 
from  different  points  of  view,  but  speak  of 
totally  different  things.  Morton  Prince  has 
pointed  out  that  "the  term  subconscious  is 
commonly  used  in  the  loosest  and  most  repre- 
hensible way  to  define  facts  of  a  different 
order,  interpretations  of  facts,  and  philoso- 
phical theories"  (9).  Hence  it  is  meaning- 
less to  predicate  any  statement  of  the  subcon- 
scious as  a  whole  without  first  defining  the 


in  the  individual  consciousness.  In  the  present  state 
of  our  knowledge  such  a  speculation  takes  us  beyond 
the  limits  of  utility,  and  therefore  of  science.  Pan- 
psychism  may,  however,  be  regarded  as  the  Utopia  of 
the  psychologist. 

126 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

sense  in  which  we  are  employing  the  term. 
Dr.  Prince  has  enunciated  its  various  mean- 
ings in  his  prefatory  note.  By  Stout  and 
others  the  term  is  used  to  denote  those 
marginal  portions  of  the  field  of  conscious- 
ness which  are  not  at  the  moment  in  the  fo- 
cus of  attention.  Here  subconscious  merely 
means  "dimly  conscious."  Myers  ascribes 
to  the  subconscious  various  supernatural 
properties  which  take  his  conception  altogeth- 
er beyond  the  limits  of  science.  We  have 
already  dealt  with  Hartmann's  picture  of  the 
subconscious  as  a  second  self  comparable  in 
all  respects  to  the  personal  consciousness. 
The  remaining  meanings  are  best  illustrated 
by  the  doctrines  of  Janet  and  Freud,  and  we 
must  now  proceed  to  examine  these  at  some 
length. 

We  have  actual  experience  only  of  our  own 
conscious  phenomena — we  deduce  the  con- 
scious phenomena  of  others  by  means  of  anal- 
ogy in  two  ways,  directly  from  what  they  tell 
us  through  the  medium  of  speech,  indirectly 
from  their  actions.*     Now  the  subconscious 

*It  may  be  maintained  that  our  knowledge  of  the 
conscious  phenomena  of  others  is  therefore  really  con- 
ceptual  in  character,   as   we   ourselves   have   no   actual 

127 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

of  Janet  and  his  followers  does  not  differ  in 
its  essential  nature  from  any  "conscious  phe- 
nomena of  others"  with  which  we  are  ac- 
quainted— its  existence  is  deduced  on  precisely 
the  same  grounds.  This  fact  has  been  ably 
demonstrated  by  Dr.  Prince  in  his  contribu- 
tion to  the  symposium.  If  we  hold  a  con- 
versation with  a  patient  whose  hand  at  the 
same  moment  writes  of  matters  which  are 
unknown  to  the  personality,  we  speak  of  the 
subconscious  phenomena  attending  the  writ- 
ing for  the  very  same  reason  that  we  speak 
of  the  conscious  phenomena  attending  the 
patient's  conversation.  The  distinction  of 
the  subconscious  lies  solely  in  the  fact  that  it 
is  dissociated  from  certain  other  "conscious 
phenomena  of  others,"  which  we  designate 
as  the  personality.  The  subconscious  of  Ja- 
net is,  therefore,  a  phenomenal  fact.     It  may 


experience  of  them.  If  conceptual  is  taken  in  an  in- 
definitely wide  sense  this  is  of  course  true.  But  such 
deductions  are  on  an  altogether  different  plane  from 
the  conceptions  of  science.  Relatively  to  the  concep- 
tions of  science  they  are  phenomena,  just  as  helium  in 
the  sun  is  a  phenomenon — and  both  science  and  every- 
day life  are  compelled  to  treat  them  as  such.  To 
refuse  to  subscribe  to  this  point  of  view  would  involve 
the  adoption  of  Solipsism. 

128 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

be  reduced  in  complexity  to  even  a  single  idea, 
but  it  remains  a  phenomenon.  Janet  himself 
has  remarked,  "These  diverse  acts  are  iden- 
tical with  those  which  we  are  accustomed  to 
observe  in  persons  like  ourselves  and  to  ex- 
plain by  the  intervention  of  intelligence.  Un- 
doubtedly one  may  say  that  a  somnambulist 
is  only  a  mechanical  doll,  but  then  we  must 
say  the  same  of  every  creature.  The  term 
*doubling-of-conscIousness'  is  not  a  philoso- 
phical explanation;  it  is  a  simple  clinical  ob- 
servation of  a  common  character  which  these 
phenomena  present."     (lo) 

If,  however,  we  now  turn  to  the  views  of 
Freud  and  Jung,  we  meet  again  with  the 
phenomenon  of  dissociation,  but  we  find  add- 
ed thereto  a  mass  of  conceptions  of  an  alto- 
gether different  character.  Limitations  of 
space  prohibit  any  adequate  description  of 
these  doctrines,  and  we  must  therefore  as- 
sume that  our  readers  are  already  acquainted 
with  their  main  features.  We  are  here  only 
concerned  with  the  general  conceptions  un- 
derlying Freud's  teaching,  and  these  may, 
perhaps,  be  described  in  our  own  terminology 
as  follows:  The  subconscious  {unhewus- 
stsein)   is  regarded  as  a  sea  of  unconscious 

129 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ideas  and  emotions,  upon  whose  surface 
plays  the  phenomenal  consciousness  of  which 
we  are  personally  aware.  These  unconscious 
ideas  are  agglomerated  into  groups  with  ac- 
companying affects,  the  systems  thus  formed 
being  termed  "complexes."  These  complexes 
are  regarded  as  possessing  both  potential 
and  kinetic  energy,  and  thus  are  capable  of 
influencing  the  flow  of  phenomenal  conscious- 
ness according  to  certain  definite  laws.  The 
nature  of  their  influence  is  dependent  upon 
the  relation  they  have  to  each  other  and  to 
the  normally  dominating  or  ego  complex. 
The  complex  may  either  cause  the  direct  in- 
troduction into  consciousness  of  its  constitu- 
ent ideas  and  affect,  or  its  influence  may  be 
distorted  and  indirect.  The  indirect  effects 
may  be  of  the  most  various  types — symbol- 
isms, word  forgetting,  disturbance  of  the  as- 
sociation processes,  etc.  A  single  idea  or 
image  in  consciousness  may  be  conditioned 
(constellated)  by  a  multiplicity  of  uncon- 
scious complexes. 

All  this  is  surely  very  different  from  any- 
thing that  we  have  hitherto  considered.  In 
what  does  this  difference  consist?  What  is 
an  "unconscious  idea" — is  not  this  a  mean- 

130 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ingless  self-contradiction  ?  Has  anybody  ever 
experienced  an  "unconscious  complex"?  The 
answer  to  all  these  questions  is  simple — we 
are  no  longer  on  the  phenomenal  plane,  we 
have  ascended  to  the  conceptual.  Uncon- 
scious ideas  and  complexes  are  not  phenom- 
enal facts,  they  are  concepts,  constructions 
devised  to  explain  certain  phenomena — they 
have  not  been  found,  they  have  been  made. 
The  implicit  assumptions  in  Freud's  doctrines 
may  be  expressed  as  follows:  If  we  imagine 
certain  entities  which  may  be  described  as 
unconscious  ideas  and  complexes,  if  we 
ascribe  certain  properties  to  these  entities, 
and  assume  them  to  act  according  to  certain 
laws — then  we  shall  find  that  the  results  thus 
deduced  will  coincide  with  the  phenomena 
which  occur  in  actual  human  experience.  This 
train  of  thought  is  the  analogue  of  that  un- 
derlying all  the  great  conceptual  construc- 
tions of  physical  science — the  atomic  theory 
the  wave  theory  of  light,  the  law  of  gravity, 
and  the  modern  theory  of  mendelian  hered- 
ity. 

We  thus  owe  to  Freud  the  first  consistent 
attempt  to  construct  a  conceptual  psychology. 
The  attempt  is,  moreover,  a  legitimate  em- 

131 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ployment  of  the  method  of  science,  the  con- 
struction of  a  conceptual  model  which  will 
enable  us  to  resume  our  experience.  It  is,  of 
course,  true  that  conceptions  have  to  be  em- 
ployed therein  which  cannot  even  be  con- 
ceived as  having  a  phenomenal  existence.  But 
we  have  seen  that  the  same  statement  is 
equally  true  of  the  conceptions  of  physics.  An 
unconscious  idea  is  a  phenomenal  impossibil- 
ity just  as  a  weightless,  frictionless  ether  is  a 
physical  phenomenal  impossibility.  It  is  no 
more  and  no  less  unthinkable  than  the  math- 
ematical conceptions^- 1.  But  objections  of 
this  kind  do  not  in  the  least  vitiate  the  use  of 
phenomenal  impossibilities  as  scientific  con- 
cepts; the  utility  of  such  conceptions  in  physi- 
cal science  will  surely  suffice  to  demonstrate 
this.  It  is  only  necessary  to  clearly  under- 
stand that  we  are  speaking  of  concepts  and 
not  of  phenomena. 

Similarly  when  we  speak  of  "complexes" 
we  mean  that  it  is  convenient  to  conceive  that 
ideas  are  bound  together  into  systems,  that 
these  systems  persist  in  the  mind,  although 
we  are  not  conscious  of  them,  and  that  they 
exert  an  influence  upon  the  flow  of  phenome- 
nal consciousness  of  which  we  may  or  may 

132 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

not  be  aware.  The  complex  may  be  said  to 
be  the  psychological  analogue  of  the  concep- 
tion of  force  in  physics.  Strictly  speaking,  it 
can  never  itself  become  a  fact  of  experience, 
a  portion  of  phenomenal  consciousness.  Cer- 
tain ideas,  affects,  and  conative  tendencies  be- 
longing to  the  complex  may  become  facts  of 
experience,  we  may  be  aware  that  we  possess 
the  complex — but  the  complex  as  a  whole  and 
as  a  directing  force  can  never  be  actually  ex- 
perienced, it  is  a  pure  conception.  This  may 
be  seen,  for  example,  in  what  may  be  termed 
the  "political  complex."  When  the  party 
politician  is  called  upon  to  consider  a  new 
measure,  his  verdict  is  largely  determined  by 
certain  constant  systems  of  ideas  and  trends 
of  thought  which  we  refer  to  as  his  "political 
complex."  He  may  be  honestly  convinced 
that  he  is  influenced  solely  by  an  unbiased 
consideration  of  the  pros  and  cons  of  the 
measure  in  question,  but  the  psychologist 
knows  that  this  is  not  really  so.  Even  if  the 
politician  is  aware  that  he  is  biassed,  this 
complicated  system  we  have  described  can 
hardly  be  present  as  a  whole  to  his  mind. 
The  "political  complex"  is  not  conscious, 
and  it  is  equally  impossible  that  it  can  be  co- 

^33 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

conscious.  It  is  merely  a  conception  which 
enables  us  to  explain  the  fact  that  when  a 
certain  man  is  confronted  with  a  political  sit- 
uation he  will  tend  to  act  in  a  certain  constant 
direction. 

We  cannot  agree  with  Dr.  Prince  when  he 
says,  "What  is  it  that  binds  the  mental  ex- 
perience of  an  emotional  railroad  accident, 
an  obsession,  or  of  a  subject  or  mood  com- 
plex, or  whatever  kind  of  association  it  be  in- 
to a  system?  The  answer  must  be  sought  in 
the  nervous  system,  not  in  the  mind"  (ii). 
We  should  prefer  to  say  that  it  must  be 
sought  in  the  conceptual  sphere,  not  in  the 
phenomenal. 

The  conception  of  the  complex  is  not,  ex- 
cept in  name,  an  altogether  new  departure  in 
psychology.  James's  description  of  the  vari- 
ous "selfs"  (12)  which  determine  a  man's 
action  can  be  immediately  translated  into  the 
language  of  complexes.  Similarly  Hoffding, 
when  discussing  the  theories  of  the  Associa- 
tionists,  has  pointed  out  that  "in  the  process 
of  association  it  is  the  connected  whole  which 
exercises  its  powers  over  the  single  ideas" 

(13)- 

The  lack  of  a    perceptual    equivalent    to 

134 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

many  of  Freud's  conceptions  is  very  striking 
when  we  peruse  such  a  work  as  the  "Traum- 
deutung."  Here  the  individual  dream  image 
is  conceived  as  being  constellated  by  a  large 
number  of  unconscious  complexes — as  a  re- 
sult of  the  combination  and  interaction  of 
these  complexes  the  single  image  emerges  in- 
to consciousness.  Can  we  form  any  idea  of 
a  state  of  mind  in  which  all  this  mass  of  men- 
tal elements  is  actually  and  phenomenally 
present?  We  have  no  evidence  whatever  of 
their  phenomenal  existence,  such  evidence  as 
we  had,  for  example,  in  the  case  of  automatic 
writing  previously  considered.  Freud  has 
himself  remarked  on  this  point,  "How  can 
one  picture  to  oneself  the  psychical  condition 
during  sleep?  Do  all  the  dream  thoughts 
(subsequently  elicited  by  analysis)  actually 
exist  together,  or  after  one  another,  or  do 
they  constitute  different  contemporaneous 
streams  finally  coalescing?  In  my  opinion, 
there  is  no  necessity  for  us  to  attempt  the 
construction  of  a  picture  of  the  psychic  state 
during  dream  formation.  We  must  not  for- 
get that  we  are  speaking  of  unconscious  think- 
ing, and  this  may  quite  possibly  proceed  alto- 
gether differently  from  the  conscious  think- 

135 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ing  with  which  we  are  acquainted"  (14). 
Similar  considerations  apply  to  Freud's  de- 
scription of  the  mechanism  of  word-forget- 
ting, mistakes  in  speaking,  etc. 

It  is  this  very  aspect  of  Freud's  teaching 
which  has  aroused  so  much  opposition,  be- 
cause the  introduction  of  conceptual  psychol- 
ogy has  seemed  so  strange  to  those  who  have 
been  accustomed  to  leave  psychology  its  phe- 
nomena, but  to  hand  over  its  concepts  to  phy- 
siology. 

All  these  difficulties  vanish  at  once  when 
we  remember  that  we  are  speaking  of  con- 
cepts and  not  of  phenomena.  We  are  no 
more  called  upon  to  picture  what  a  mass  of 
simultaneous  unconscious  ideas  may  be  like, 
than  a  physicist  is  called  upon  to  picture  what 
an  ether  without  weight  and  without  friction 
may  be  like.  It  is  of  the  utmost  importance 
that  the  phenomenal  and  conceptual  should 
be  sharply  distinguished  when  dealing  with 
these  questions.  The  neglect  of  this  principle 
has,  we  believe,  led  to  that  confusion  of 
terminology  and  treatment  stigmatized  by 
Dr.  Prince  in  his  communication  upon  the 
Subconscious  at  the  recent  Geneva  Congress. 
It  is  best  to  limit  the  term  subconscious  to  the 

136 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

phenomenal  facts  demonstrated  by  Janet,  and 
to  speak  of  Freud's  conception  as  the  "un- 
conscious," the  hteral  translation  of  the  Ger- 
man Unbewnsstsein. 

Scott  (15)  has  objected  that  Freud's  doc- 
trine has  revived  an  atomistic  theory  of  psy- 
chology— but  all  sciences  are  compelled  to 
more  or  less  arbitrarily  divide  phenomenal 
continua  into  artificial  elements.  They  de- 
mand, in  fact,  a  "continuity  of  conception  to- 
gether with  a  conceived  discontinuity  of  the 
material."  The  conceptual  theory  of  the  un- 
conscious is,  moreover,  constructed  on  an  al- 
together different  plane  to  the  philosophical 
system  of  the  old  Associationists,  in  which 
the  elements  were  regarded  as  real,  and  the 
unity  of  the  whole  as  unreal. 

It  must  be  definitely  understood  that  we 
are  making  no  attempt  to  demonstrate  the 
validity  of  Freud's  conceptions.  Such  an  aim 
lies  entirely  outside  the  scope  of  the  present 
paper.  Our  sole  concern  is  to  show  that  his 
conceptions  are  cast  within  the  legitimate 
framework  of  science,  and  that  they  have  all 
the  properties  which  science  demands  that  a 
concept  shall  have.  But  if  this  be  so,  then 
the  validity  of  Freud's  theories  must  be  test- 

137 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ed  by  the  method  which  has  estaWished  all 
the  conceptions  of  science,  the  method  of 
experiment  and  verification.  They  cannot  be 
proved  or  disproved  by  a  priori  considera- 
tions. The  conceptions  must  be  applied,  and 
the  results  thus  deduced  must  be  compared 
with  the  results  which  are  actually  found. 
The  truth  of  a  scientific  conception  is  neith- 
er more  nor  less  than  its  utility  in  enabling  us 
to  resume  and  predict  our  experience. 

We  must  now  proceed  further  and  endeav- 
or to  determine  the  relation  between  Janet's 
subconscious  and  Freud's  unconscious.  This 
relation  is  often  held  to  be  one  of  rivalry,  but 
if  our  analysis  of  the  two  doctrines  is  correct, 
this  view  must  be  erroneous.  There  can  be 
no  rivalry  between  a  description  of  the  phe- 
nomenal facts,  and  a  conceptual  model  con- 
structed to  resume  these  facts.  The  phenom- 
enon of  dissociation  has  not  been  disputed  by 
Freud — on  the  contrary,  it  takes  a  prominent 
place  amongst  the  circumstances  which  he  de- 
sires to  explain.  His  work  lies  on  a  deeper 
plane,  his  aim  is  not  a  description  of  the 
facts,  but  the  conceptual  explanation  of  these 
facts.  We  have  here,  in  fact,  that  progres- 
sion by  which  the  method  of  science  is  invari- 

138 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

ably  characterized.  Firstly,  the  collection 
and  classification  of  facts,  represented  here 
by  the  co-ordinated  description  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  subconscious  or  co-conscious; 
secondly,  the  construction  of  a  conceptual 
model  to  explain  these  facts,  represented  by 
the  theories  of  Freud.  Precisely  analogous 
advances  are  to  be  found  in  the  history  of 
physics.  Kepler,  for  example,  by  classifying 
the  successive  positions  in  space  of  the  plan- 
ets, demonstrated  that  each  moved  in  an  el- 
lipse, one  of  whose  foci  was  occupied  by  the 
sun.  Newton  subsequently  explained  this 
fact  by  the  construction  of  the  law  of  gravity. 
It  must  be  carefully  observed  that  we  have 
spoken  throughout  of  the  relation  of  Freud's 
doctrines  to  Janet's  conception  of  the  subcon- 
scious, not  to  Janet's  work  as  a  whole.  There 
can  be  no  question  that  this  larger  relation 
is  to  a  considerable  extent  one  of  conflict.  But 
this  conflict  only  arises  when  Janet  leaves  the 
phenomenal  plane  and  proceeds  to  construct 
conceptual  generalizations.  Thus  his  views 
on  the  essential  nature  of  hysteria  and  psy- 
chasthenia,  the  separation  of  the  latter  as  a 
distinct  entity,  the  origin  of  obsessions,  and 
other  similar  points — these  cannot  be  recon- 

139 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

died  altogether  with  the  teaching  of  Freud. 
But  whatever  the  ultimate  verdict  on  these 
theories  may  be,  Janet's  indestructible  monu- 
ment will  always  be  his  vindication  of  the  psy- 
chological method,  his  demonstration  of  the 
phenomena  of  dissociation,  and  a  description 
of  the  facts  of  hysteria  which  has  never  been 
excelled  in  the  history  of  psychiatry. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  summarize  the 
results  of  our  investigation:  The  word  sub- 
conscious has  been  used  by  various  authors 
to  denote  facts  belonging  to  altogether  differ- 
ent categories,  and  it  is  necessary  in  the  inter- 
ests of  clearness  that  a  terminology  should  be 
devised  which  will  obviate  this  confusion.  Ex- 
cluding those  speculative  interpretations 
which  do  not  enter  into  the  field  of  science, 
these  facts  may  be  grouped  under  three 
heads.  Firstly,  the  marginal  elements  of  phe- 
nomenal consciousness  (the  subconscious  of 
Stout),  secondly,  dissociated  portions  of  phe- 
nomenal consciousness  (the  co-conscious  of 
Morton  Prince,  and  the  subconscious  of  Ja- 
net), thirdly,  a  non-phenomenal  conceptual 
construction  designed  to  explain  the  facts  of 
phenomenal  consciousness  (the  unconscious 
of  Freud).     All  these  form  part  of  the  ma- 

140 


SUBCONSCIOUS  PHENOMENA 

terial  of  psychology,  none  of  them  form  part 
of  the  material  of  physiology. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 

1.  Schopenhauer.     Satz  vom  Grunde. 

2.  H'elmholtz.     Die  Tatsachen  in  der  Wahrnehmung. 

3.  Hartmann.  Das  Unbewusste,  quoted  by  Janet, 
JouRN.  OF  Abnorm.  Psychol.,  June,  1907. 

4.  Hoffding.     Hisory  of  Philosophy,  p.  583. 

5.  Miinsterberg.     Psychology  and  Life,  p.   127. 

6.  Pearson.    Grammar  of  Science,  2d  ed.,  p.  281. 

7.  Ibid. 

8.  Mach.  "De  la  Physique  et  de  la  Psychologic," 
L'annee   Psychologique,   1906. 

9.  Morton  Prince.  "The  Subconscious,"  Comtes 
Rendus,  Geneva  Congress  of  Psychology,  1909. 

10.  Janet.  "The  Subconscious,"  Journ.  of  Abnorm. 
Psychol.,  June,  1907. 

11.  Prince.  "The  Unconscious,"  Journ.  of  Abnorm. 
Psychol.,  Oct.,  1908. 

12.  James.     Principles  of  Psychology,  Vol.  i,  p.  291. 

13.  Hoflfding.    The  Problems  of  Philosophy,  p.  18. 

14.  Freud.     Die  Traumdeutung,  p.  205. 

15.  Scott.  "An  Interpretation  of  the  Psycho-analytic 
Method  in  Psychotherapy,"  Journ.  of  Abnorm.  Psy- 
chol., Feb.,  1909. 


141 


t 


w 


RETI 


4'  "'■ 


I 


^ 


'>b 


University  of  California 

SOUTHERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 

405  Hilgard  Avenue,  Los  Angeles,  CA  90024-1388 

Return  this  material  to  the  library 

from  which  it  was  borrowed. 


I    /w;  NOV  n  1  zooi 


^  2  ^  2m 


2/92  Series  9482 


^'' 


UC  SOUTHFRN  RFCIOfJ 


AL  I  IBRAHY  FACILITY 


^^      000  233  886    i 


A  ■ 


Univ( 
Sc 


